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LETTER FROM THE EXECUTIVE BOARD 
We would like to thank everyone who made our inaugural 
issue a huge success.  In the short time since our inception, we 
have grown a great deal.  Our distribution for this issue has tri-
pled and our staff has grown.  Our reputation outside of the 
American University Washington College of Law community 
has also grown.  Recently, we were invited to George Mason 
University’s Civil Rights Law Journal Symposium.   We are also 
regularly receiving outside submissions from students attending 
other law schools.  Indeed, we have proven that a discourse on 
diversity and the law was not only necessary but also desired by 
many in the legal field.  We have always been confident that we 
would be a success and are happy that after our first issue, our 
fellow law students, professors, and practitioners are taking part 
in the unique voice of The Modern American.   
Our inaugural issue focused on “The State of Our Union,”  
thus it is only appropriate that this issue focuses on “The Un-
ion’s Response.”  Today, the United States government, more 
than any other entity, plays the unique role of “protector” and 
“persecutor” of underrepresented peoples.  The focus of this 
issue is on the government’s role in responding to the problems 
of minorities or in creating problems for minorities.  The Mod-
ern American seeks to analyze both the positive and negative 
effects of the government’s response to national security, sover-
eignty, and repairing past wrongs.    
Again we would like to thank our advisers Professors Vin-
cent Eng, Brenda Smith, Pamela Bridgewater, Jamin Raskin, 
and the Director of Diversity Services, Ms. Sherry Weaver.   It is 
with great pleasure that we once again can say:  Enjoy this issue 
of The Modern American.   
 
 
Sincerely, 
 
Lydia Edwards  Co-Editor-in-Chief 
LeeAnn O’Neill Co-Editor-in-Chief 
Chris McChesney  Managing Editor   
Preeti Vijayakumaran Senior Articles Editor 
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American University Washington College of Law is an equal 
opportunity, affirmative action university. 
The Modern American is American University Washington Col-
lege of Law’s student-run publication dedicated to diversity and 
the law.  This publication analyzes the legal system’s treatment 
of racial, sexual, ethnic, and other underrepresented people.  We 
intend to present an analysis of the current social and legal 
remedies for minority issues.  Our philosophy is to present a 
balanced perspective and encourage all viewpoints regardless of 
political or social leaning.  
 
The Modern American is not just limited to legal issues, there-
fore we include other relevant information to educate the inter-
ested reader, such as an examination of upcoming legislation, 
upcoming books or movies relevant to the minority community, 
and/or a spotlight on interesting people who are heading legal 
and social change in the United States. 
 
If you are interested in submitting an article to be considered for 
publication in The Modern American, submitting topic ideas, or 
would like to obtain more information please visit our website 
at http://wcl.american.edu/modernamerican/ or email us at 
tma@wcl.american.edu. 
 
No portion of this publication may be reprinted without the ex-
press written permission of The Modern American.  All corre-
spondence, reprinting and subscription requests and articles 
submit ted for  publicat ion may be sent to: 
tma@wcl.american.edu.  The views expressed in this publica-
tion are those of the writers and are not necessarily those of the 
editors or American University.   Copyright The Modern Ameri-
can, 2005. 
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THE RETURN OF J. EDGAR HOOVER: THE FBI’S REVERSION TO 
POLITICAL INTELLIGENCE GATHERING 
 
By Zehra Naqvi* 
Q  :  Which method(s) are you comfortable with the FBI 
employing to shore up our domestic security?  
a)  Active investigation of a Quaker-affiliated or-
ganization1  
b)  Recording the license plate numbers of 
peaceful environmentalist protestors2 
c)  Monitoring anti-war demonstrations3 
d)  Intercepting emails by political activists4 
e)  All of the above. 
 
If you answered “e,” you’re in luck.  You’re on board with 
the FBI’s current efforts to make us safer.  If, on the other hand, 
you don’t recall authorizing such tactics to enhance your security 
and feel that they are vaguely reminiscent of McCarthyism-era 
tactics, join the club.  Our tax dollars are being wasted on col-
lecting more useless information instead of analyzing the useful 
information we already have. 
After the domestic spying outrage that occurred in the 1950s 
and 1960s, we had safeguards put into effect to prevent exactly 
these kinds of activity from occurring again, but they were dis-
mantled by this Administration; the Administration played on 
our fears about a repeat of 9/11 and claimed that our security was 
at risk by the restrictive nature of the guidelines.  In fact, the 
guidelines were protecting us from ourselves or the FBI manifes-
tation of us.  Watering them down is an attempt to hoodwink the 
American population into sanctioning the removal of the safe-
guards and allowing the FBI to break the bargain made in the 
1970s to refrain from engaging in such political intelligence 
gathering.  The American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) is beat-
ing its drums to warn the public and hoping that we, the courts, 
and Congress hear the call and respond. 
THE BARGAIN: A HISTORY OF THE GUIDELINES 
“Knowledge is the key to control.  Secrecy should no 
longer be allowed to shield the existence of constitutional, 
legal and moral problems from the scrutiny of all three 
branches of government or from the American people     
themselves.”5   
 
Church Committee Report  
 
The FBI’s chief focus in the 1950s and 1960s was rooting 
out Communism, and to that end, the civil liberties of many indi-
viduals and groups were violated as the FBI pursued them with-
out any evidence or reasonable suspicion that any of them had 
actually committed any crimes.6  The political impetus to quash 
Communism rallied the agency into conducting heightened do-
mestic surveillance based on political ideology, stifling dissent, 
and political opposition.7  The FBI, under the auspices of Direc-
tor J. Edgar Hoover, ran a counterintelligence program, 
“COINTELPRO,” which investigated prominent activists and 
groups such as the National Organization for Women and the 
American Indian Movement.8  Ward Churchill’s book, The 
COINTELPRO Papers: Documents from the FBI's Secret Wars 
Against Dissent in the United States, documents some of the 
strategies employed by the FBI in its domestic “war against dis-
sent.”9  As revelations of the FBI’s investigatory abuses sur-
faced, Congress held hearings and in 1975, the Senate initiated 
an investigation into the abuses.10   
The Church Committee found that “the FBI had infiltrated 
civil rights and peace groups, had burglarized political groups to 
gain information about their members and activities, and had 
‘swept in vast amounts of information about the personal lives, 
views, and associations of American citizens.’”11  The Commit-
tee Report declared that there was “a consistent pattern in which 
programs initiated with limited goals, such as preventing crimi-
nal violence or identifying foreign spies, were expanded to what 
witnesses characterized as ‘vacuum cleaners,’ sweeping in infor-
mation about lawful activities of American citizens.”12  The FBI 
had created files on over one million Americans, investigated the 
NAACP for 25 years, compiled information on student groups 
for use in future applications to government jobs, and had a plan 
“to summarily arrest thousands of Americans in case of a na-
tional emergency.”13 
The Committee’s final report noted that “too often intelli-
gence has lost its focus and domestic intelligence activities have 
invaded individual privacy and violated the rights of lawful as-
sembly and political expression.  Unless new and tighter controls 
are established by legislation, domestic intelligence activities 
threaten to undermine our democratic society and fundamentally 
alter its nature.”14  The report stated that a rise in Executive 
power, secrecy, and avoidance of the rule of law were the condi-
tions that facilitated the abusive practices.15  The report con-
cluded “the ultimate goal is a statutory mandate for the federal 
government's domestic security function that will ensure that the 
FBI, as the primary domestic security investigative agency, con-
centrates upon criminal conduct as opposed to political rhetoric 
or association.”16 
The Committee recommended prohibitions on the FBI, for-
bidding the agency from continuing its tactics of discrediting 
political opposition, media manipulation, distorting data to influ-
ence government policy and public perceptions, and preventing 
the free exchange of ideas.17  The Committee sought to achieve 
these ends by recommending that the FBI refrain from: 1) col-
lecting or disseminating information for a federal official for a 
political purpose; 2) interfering with constitutionally protected 
advocacy activities; 3) harassing individuals or physically intimi-
 dating them through obvious surveillance and interviews; and 4) 
maintaining dossiers on the political inclinations and private 
lives of Americans unless the demands of national security war-
rant such activities.18   
Attorney General Edward Levi issued new guidelines for 
FBI investigations in response to these findings, setting a higher 
standard for domestic surveillance by the FBI.19  Since the 
guidelines were adopted with legislative “consultation and over-
sight” through the Church Committee’s investigation and report, 
the guidelines have a “quasi-legislative status,” but did not have 
the force of actual legislation.20  Because the FBI adopted new 
guidelines for itself, the legislative effort to develop an FBI 
charter was abandoned.21  Until Attorney General Ashcroft’s 
unilateral changes to the guidelines in 2002, all revisions of the 
guidelines were made with Congressional consultation and over-
sight.22 
Attorney General Levi’s guidelines “specified that investi-
gations should be limited to exposing criminal conduct and 
should not involve simple monitoring of unpopular political 
views.”23  The FBI could only initiate investigations “where 
‘specific and articulable facts’ indicated criminal activity.”24  
Unpopular ideologies or political dissent were not considered 
sufficient reasons to justify an investigation or restraint on 
someone’s free practice of their First Amendment rights.25  The 
guidelines were somewhat diluted in the 1980s, but remained 
largely intact until Attorney General John Ashcroft changed 
them in 2002.26  
BREAKING THE BARGAIN: ASHCROFT’S REVISION OF 
THE GUIDELINES 
Eight months after the September 11th attacks, Attorney 
General Ashcroft unilaterally revised the guidelines without 
consulting with Congress, claiming that the FBI’s hands were 
tied on its terrorism investigations as a result of the old guide-
lines.27  The revised guidelines allowed the FBI to “freely infil-
trate mosques, churches, and synagogues and other houses of 
worship, listen in on online chat rooms and read message 
boards” without any indication of criminal activity, substantially 
lowering the barriers to civil liberty violations and increasing the 
likelihood that the FBI will be inundated with more informa-
tion.28  This essentially reversed the work of the Church Com-
mittee and marked the return of practices that were sanctioned 
under Hoover’s FBI reign, when the FBI engaged in “political 
intelligence” gathering, stealing membership lists of suspect 
organizations, and gathering vast amounts of information on 
innocent constitutionally protected activities.29  This is espe-
cially disturbing because the Attorney General Levi’s adoption 
of the guidelines is what prevented Congress from enacting leg-
islation to ensure that the FBI observe the rule of law and adhere 
to strict guidelines on opening and maintaining investigations.30 
Arguably, the changes are further unwarranted because in-
ternational terrorism investigations have generally been con-
ducted under a separate body of foreign intelligence guidelines 
that have traditionally been more lax than those governing do-
mestic surveillance.  It is therefore highly unlikely that the roll-
back of the domestic guidelines was meant to facilitate catching 
terrorists abroad.31  In effect, the revised rules blur the lines be-
tween international and domestic surveillance guidelines, deny-
ing American citizens the protections they have thus far enjoyed 
by subjecting them to greater invasions of privacy.32 
The three basic results of the changed guidelines are that 
without any “scintilla of suspicion”33 or guidance as to what 
information must be recorded or how long a group can be moni-
tored, the FBI can: 1) attend domestic public group meetings; 2) 
mine various commercial databases and share the information; 
and 3) cut down on internal review procedures, essentially 
eliminating a level of scrutiny.34 
In addition to threatening the civil liberties of groups and 
individuals and risking a return to gathering political intelli-
gence on groups, the changed guidelines also pose the serious 
risk of undermining efficient intelligence gathering since the 
“vacuum cleaner” approach will be reinstalled in place of tar-
geted intelligence-gathering efforts; more information might 
undermine the agency’s ability to sift through and analyze its  
usefulness, and thereby actually hamper the fight against terror-
ism.35  The guidelines adopted by Attorney General Levi “were 
intended to make the FBI’s security operations more efficient by 
tying FBI inquiries and investigations to some modest showing 
that they were focused on suspected criminal or terrorist activity 
for security reasons.”36  The recent revisions detract from this 
goal and reverse the positive trend of the past half century.37 
THE AFTERMATH: BAD HABITS DIE HARD 
News articles over the past two years demonstrate that re-
cent surveillance activities of political demonstrations are rais-
ing public concerns that the FBI is once again engaging in ques-
tionable practices.38  Some of these activities are conducted 
through the new domestic surveillance program, made up of 
Joint Terrorism Task Forces (JTTFs), which partners local law 
enforcement with federal agents and other officers to combat 
terrorism.39  The Associated Press reported that “[t]here are ter-
rorism task forces in 100 cities and with more than 3,700 mem-
bers, including at least 2,000 FBI agents, state and local police, 
and other federal law enforcement officials.  More than half of 
the task forces were formed after the terror attacks of Sept. 11, 
2001.”40  In total, there are 66 JTTFs.41 
The amended guidelines opened the door for JTTFs to en-
gage in many forms of domestic spying, specifically by allowing 
law enforcement to have free reign on monitoring online activi-
ties, private sector databases, and religious houses of worship, 
and once again being able to monitor innocuous First Amend-
ment activities without indication of any criminal activity, as the 
old guidelines required. 
The public should be concerned that current spying efforts 
are too broad, that these efforts have not only constituted an 
inefficient use of resources, but have also had a chilling effect 
on First Amendment freedoms.42  The public does not want their 
tax dollars spent for spying on groups that merely engage in 
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 civil disobedience nor do they want to “return to the days when 
peaceful critics become the subject of government investiga-
tions”43  The ACLU asserts that the FBI has been compiling 
license plate numbers from environmental and other group pro-
tests, monitoring peaceful demonstrations, intercepting emails, 
and trading political intelligence information with other law 
enforcement agencies.44  A New York Times article cited an FBI 
memo about monitoring demonstrations as proof, stating that 
there is “a coordinated nationwide effort to collect intelligence 
regarding demonstrations.”45  This article also cited a recent suit 
against the government, brought by critics of the current admini-
stration that found themselves on the “no-fly” lists after Septem-
ber 11th, as signaling “a return to the abuses of the 1960s and 
1970s, when J. Edgar Hoover was the FBI director and agents 
routinely spied on political protestors like the Rev. Dr. Martin 
Luther King Jr.”46  The article quoted the executive director of 
the ACLU as saying, “[t]he FBI is dangerously targeting Ameri-
cans who are engaged in nothing more than lawful protest and 
dissent...[t]he line between terrorism and legitimate civil disobe-
dience is blurred.”47 
THE LAWSUIT: THE ACLU BEATING ITS DRUMS 
Perhaps the biggest concern of all is the widespread igno-
rance as to how the JTTFs operates and the extent of collabora-
tion between state legal enforcement entities and the FBI.48  In 
an effort to get a better understanding of the procedures and 
rules of operation behind the JTTFs, the ACLU recently filed a 
lawsuit to seek expedited processing of its Freedom of Informa-
tion Act (FOIA) requests regarding general JTTF procedures 
and any information it might have collected on specific environ-
mental, religious, and civil liberty groups.  To enhance the law-
suit, the ACLU partnered with the American-Arab Anti-
Discrimination Committee, Greenpeace, People for the Ethical 
Treatment of Animals, and United for Peace and Justice, in fil-
ing its lawsuit against the FBI Joint Terrorism Task Force 
(JTTF) and Department of Justice in DC.49  The lawsuit requests 
injunctive relief to intervene in the expedited processing of the 
FOIA requests regarding the composition and procedures of the 
taskforce and the criteria that JTTFs use to select who to investi-
gate.50 
The Freedom of Information Act (1966) is significant as it 
established a federal law that recognized the right of the public 
to request information from federal government agencies.51  
There are exceptions as to what information can be requested, 
and some information may be redacted for security, confidenti-
ality, or other reasons.52  The national security exception may be 
used to block a FOIA request such as this one, because it asks 
for information regarding the inner workings of the JTTFs.53   
According to 28 C.F.R. § 16.5(d)(1)(iv), requestors who 
want the government to expedite their requests by processing 
these requests out of sequence seek expedited treatment and 
must demonstrate: 
(i)  Circumstances in which the lack of expedited treat-
ment could reasonably be expected to pose an im-
minent threat to the life or physical safety of an 
individual; 
(ii)  An urgency to inform the public about an actual or 
alleged federal government activity, if made by a 
person primarily engaged in disseminating infor-
mation; 
(iii) The loss of substantial due process rights; or 
(iv)  A matter of widespread and exceptional media in-
terest in which there exist possible questions about 
the government's integrity which affect public con-
fidence (emphasis added). 
The ACLU filed this lawsuit after the FBI failed to respond 
to their request for expedited processing of their FOIA re-
quests.54  The ACLU argues that it is entitled to expedite proc-
essing on the grounds of the second and fourth conditions.55  
Specifically, because the fear of “increased surveillance of po-
litical, religious, and community organizations by the FBI” 
might chill public participation in political activity, the ACLU, 
by virtue of its activities in defense of civil rights and civil liber-
ties, is an entity “primarily engaged in disseminating informa-
tion,”56 and thus has standing to seek such processing: 
There has been growing public concern about the 
FBI’s monitoring, surveillance, and infiltration of 
organizations on the basis of national origin, racial 
and/or ethnic background, religious affiliation, or-
ganizational membership, political views or affilia-
tion, or participation in protest activities or demon-
strations . . . [there has also been] cooperation be-
tween the FBI and local law enforcement to moni-
tor peaceful political demonstrations . . . [and] nu-
merous published reports of FBI agents questioning 
or spying on peace activists, anti-war activists, and 
person of Arab or Muslim background.57 
As a result, the ACLU asked the FBI to turn over all records 
regarding any of the plaintiffs in this action.58  Additionally, 
they requested all “records relating to the purpose, mission, and 
activities of JTTFs,” particularly those pertaining to domestic 
surveillance on the basis of political views.  The ACLU argues 
that the FBI has 1) failed to disclose any responsive records, and 
2) is improperly withholding the requested records.59 
The defendants responded on July 5, 2005 by arguing that: 
1) the ACLU has not met its burden for showing that expedited 
processing is appropriate; 2) “compelling need” is a narrow 
standard that is not met here; and 3) denial of such processing is 
subject to judicial review under a deferential standard.60 They 
also averred that the ACLU’s two FOIA requests encompassed 
93 subject matters and the FBI was going through its findings in 
a “methodical, organized approach.”61   
The defendants concluded that based on the articles cited by 
the ACLU, there is no current “exceptional media interest” or 
“urgency to inform the public,” since the media reports date 
back to 2004 and many of them do not directly mention the 
JTTFs or the plaintiffs.62  It also argues that the ACLU is not an 
entity “primarily engaged in disseminating information,” but 
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 rather a “litigation organization.”63  The overall case of the de-
fendants seems to be that the ACLU is merely citing its own 
concerns and that there is no real media interest or urgency to 
inform the public.64  They also caution that to allow this request 
to be expedited would open the floodgates to the ACLU and 
other organizations who want their requests fulfilled ahead of 
others on matters that are not sufficiently pressing.65  The defen-
dants, therefore, requested that the Court “(i) deny plaintiff’s 
motion for a preliminary injunction; (ii) grant defendants’ cross-
motion for partial summary judgment on plaintiff’s claim for 
expedited FOIA processing; and (iii) grant a stay of proceedings 
to permit further processing of the FOIA requests at issue.”66 
The ACLU, in its reply on July 19, 2005, countered that 
there is, in fact, a widespread media interest in the subject, and 
that their record of articles was merely exemplary, not all-
inclusive.67  Furthermore, the ACLU argued that the articles date 
back to 2004 because the FOIA requests were filed in 2004 and 
the FBI’s own delays in responding are to blame for the articles 
being outdated.68  The ACLU also argues that the FBI is making 
a “circular argument,” whereby the ACLU must demonstrate 
that files were maintained on it and the other plaintiffs in order 
to get the files about them, it is asking the ACLU to prove what 
it is trying to find out.69  The articles suggest that there has been 
“targeted monitoring and surveillance of Muslim and Arab 
Americans” and the problem is pervasive, urgent, and ongoing 
and thus merits close scrutiny by examination of the records.70 
Additionally, though the ACLU works to defend civil rights and 
civil liberties and uses litigation as one strategy to accomplish 
its work, it engages in the dissemination of information by pub-
lishing reports and newsletters, issuing email alerts, and upload-
ing such content on its website to further raise awareness about 
important issues.71   
The ACLU further points out that the one document the FBI 
has handed over “confirms the relevance of [the] articles to the 
subject of plaintiff’s requests” by showing that the FBI closely 
monitored United for Peace and Justice’s website and peaceful 
protests leading up to the Republican and Democratic national 
conventions and the 2004 election, noting its anti-war rhetoric 
and incorrectly describing it an “anarchist group.”72  The general 
public, the media, and legislators themselves have demonstrated 
a strong interest in the FBI’s activities and want to ensure that 
civil liberties are not being unjustly infringed in the name of 
national security.73  The Court should not grant a stay in pro-
ceedings, but rather grant the motion for a preliminary injunc-
tion, entitling the ACLU to expedited processing of its requests, 
or at least set up a reasonable schedule for the FBI to comply 
with the ACLU’s request.74  
SEEKING RECORDS, SEEKING CHANGE 
Whether or not the ACLU and its fellow plaintiffs succeed 
in getting the records they seek, it is unlikely that they will get 
all the information they want.  The lawsuit and the overall cam-
paign against increasingly intrusive FBI surveillance may, how-
ever, meet other types of success.  The ACLU’s campaign and 
lawsuit raises awareness about the FBI’s activities and might 
pressure Congress to conduct an investigation and issue binding 
guidelines on the agency.  It is important to ensure that the 
amended guidelines do not enable the agency to return to its pre-
1976 era practices.  Since Ashcroft unilaterally changed the 
guidelines, dismantling the bargain struck years ago when the 
creation of a FBI charter was abandoned, Congress should once 
again look closely at what the FBI is doing and how it is carry-
ing out domestic surveillance.  Political intelligence gathering is 
reprehensible and a misuse of resources at a critical time for 
national security. 
The public deserves to know how its state and federal re-
sources are being allocated for investigations and whether need-
less investigations are wasting resources.  The lack of informa-
tion and heightened secrecy of FBI procedures signal that we are 
regressing to old patterns and using domestic surveillance as a 
weapon against innocent Americans, thereby wasting resources 
and inundating our intelligence personnel with too much useless 
information.  When the FBI wastes resources in this way, the 
remaining resources dedicated to analysis of the helpful infor-
mation fall short.  Furthermore, such publicity and any informa-
tion that is released might also compel states to reevaluate their 
level of participation on JTTF activities and strengthen their 
resolve to balance the need to combat terrorism with cost-
effective, targeted, and reasonable investigations, instead of 
overarching strategies to keep ongoing terror investigations. 
The lack of Congressional oversight on the 2002 guideline 
changes and the increased threat they pose to civil liberties 
should compel Congress to take a more active stance on the 
FBI’s activities.  Some recommendations for how Congress 
might place a check on the FBI’s activities are requiring:  (1) 
“prior notice and meaningful consultation before future guide-
line changes can take effect;” (2) “the adoption, following Con-
gressional consultation and comment, of Guidelines for collec-
tion, use, disclosure and retention of public event information 
and data mining;” (3) reports on the impact of the guidelines on 
open society, free speech, and privacy, costs, and benefits; and 
(4) public reporting of statistical information regarding the num-
ber, duration, and cost of investigative inquiries.75 
Domestic surveillance is not a means to peek into the homes 
and lives of our neighbors to discover whether they hold un-
popular political or religious views, but is instead a means of 
getting critical information about domestic threats.  It should be 
executed through targeted investigations without unnecessarily 
compromising the civil liberties of American citizens who are 
merely protesting government policies on different subject mat-
ters.  The FBI’s focus has not remained on one group.  First it 
was Communists, but gradually, the scope broadened to include 
people who opposed the political administration.  The spotlight 
is currently turned onto Muslims and Arabs, but it will inevita-
bly continue to enlarge in scope to peer into the activities and 
opinions of environmental, political advocacy groups, and other 
organizations and individuals, simply because the machinery is 
in place to do so, and there is no red light to stop the FBI.  The 
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articles mentioned earlier in this article and in the lawsuit sug-
gest that the scope has already enlarged.  At this moment, the 
Court has the power to signal a clear red light allowing expe-
dited processing of the requests.  Otherwise, the FBI will take it 
as a green light to continue its activities and fail in its responsi-
bility to comply with the request.  If the Court grants a stay, 
Congress should be on alert that it has the final opportunity and 
responsibility to ask the necessary and vital questions about 
JTTF procedures, protocols, and findings.  Increasingly, the do-
mestic surveillance vehicle meant to protect us from domestic 
threats poses one of the most serious threats to our civil liberties 
and while the power of change rests with Congress, the responsi-
bility to push for it rests with us.  
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 IT’S ALL ABOUT THE BENJAMINS: ECONOMIC OBSTACLES   
PLUGGING THE DIVERSITY PIPELINE INTO THE PRACTICE OF LAW 
 
By Vanessa Johnson* 
F ull and equal participation of minorities in the legal pro-fession has been a concern for the American Bar Asso-ciation (ABA) for decades.1  Even though the overall 
representation of minorities in the United States is approximately 
30%, the ABA Presidential Advisory Council on Diversity 
(ACD) in the Profession reports that, “[n]early 90% of the legal 
profession is white, with racial and ethnic minorities making up 
the remaining 10 or 11%.”2  However, “law firms, corporate le-
gal departments, government, and the judiciary cannot recruit 
attorneys of color . . . as long as there remain too few people who 
decide to enter the profession in the first place.”3  Consequently, 
it is imperative to examine the roots of educational obstacles to 
the legal profession and how they impact the diversity pipeline 
into the legal profession. 
Studies indicate that socio-economic status has “the most 
significant influence on educational attainment.”4  Regardless of 
“pre-college aspirations, self-image, and college grades [. . .] 
upper-class students are more successful in getting professional 
credentials than their less advantaged counterparts.”5  Asians and 
Caucasians have the highest median incomes and advanced de-
gree percentages, ranging from 9.5% to 17.4%.  Meanwhile, His-
panics and African Americans have the lowest median incomes 
and advanced degree percentages ranging from 3.8% to 4.8% 
respectively.6  Furthermore, a disproportionate percentage of 
minorities come from a disadvantaged background.7   The ab-
sence of any significant exploration of the link between socio-
economic status and the under-representation of minorities in the 
legal profession is surprising. 
Legal scholars and practicing attorneys have offered various 
hypotheses to explain the obstacles that minorities face when 
entering legal education and practice.  They often attack affirma-
tive action, over-reliance on LSAT scores in admissions criteria, 
and the absence of racially and ethnically diverse role models to 
provide information about the legal profession.8  Additionally, 
authorities advocate specific ways to solve these issues.9  They 
support initiatives, including seminars to assist disadvantaged 
minorities with LSAT preparation, pre-enrollment institutes to 
prepare students for the rigors of law school, and special recruit-
ment programs to raise the interest of minorities in the profes-
sion.10 
Despite these initiatives, diversity in the legal profession 
will likely remain low because education attainment issues fac-
ing minorities may bar entry into the legal profession.  This es-
say asserts that financial obstacles are significant barriers pre-
venting qualified, under-represented minorities from pursuing 
careers in the legal profession.  First, this article examines how 
federal financial aid policy creates excessive educational debt 
burdens for minority college graduates.  Second, it discusses the 
effect of the anti-affirmative action movement on minority-
targeted scholarships, which in turn creates another financial 
barrier for minorities interested in attending law school.  Third, it 
examines how the financial costs of law school, when compared 
to other graduate programs, discourage minority students.  Fi-
nally, this article proposes private funding of minority scholar-
ships as a possible solution to help resolve these diversity pipe-
line obstacles. 
THE LOAN-BASED FEDERAL FINANCIAL AID POLICY 
DISPROPORTIONATELY BURDONS MINORITY        
GRADUATES WITH EXCESSIVE DEBT 
Almost four decades ago, Congress enacted the Higher Edu-
cation Act of 1965 (HEA), which  “institutionalized federal sup-
port for higher education as a national interest and pledged that 
no student would be denied opportunities in higher education due 
to financial barriers.”11  Every five years, Congress reauthorizes 
the HEA, often adding amendments that change the scope of 
funding for student financial aid, state-federal partnerships, and 
institutional support.12  However, federal student aid policy 
steadily transformed from a grant-based system into a loan-based 
system beginning in the 1980s.13  At the same time, public col-
lege tuition costs accelerated.14  Specifically, tuition at public 
four-year colleges increased by 166% and at public two-year 
colleges by 112%.15  Therefore, despite financial aid benefits, 
this combination of tuition increases and “reliance on student 
loans” has continually limited under-represented minorities.16 
Given this increased reliance on student loans to finance 
higher education, the debt graduates will accrue necessarily 
shapes the decision-making process occurring before and after 
the completion of undergraduate studies: whether to attend col-
lege, where to attend college, what to study, whether to continue 
to graduate school, and what kinds of careers to pursue.17  The 
decisions students make, especially after college, are more lim-
ited for borrowers than for non-borrowers.  Although this nega-
tive consequence of educational debt affects all borrowers, 
“African American, Hispanic, and lower-income students are 
disproportionately represented among students whose decisions 
are limited as a result of borrowing for college.”18  Since patterns 
of student borrowing are affected by race, gender, and class char-
acteristics, the reality of higher education for African Americans, 
Hispanics, and students from lower-income families is the neces-
sary accumulation of educational debt.19  Students with higher 
debt burdens are less likely to apply to graduate or professional 
school.20 
 
 
8 THE MODERN AMERICAN 
 THE EFFECTS OF THE ANTI-AFFIRMATIVE ACTION 
MOVEMENT 
The Supreme Court addressed affirmative action in under-
graduate admissions in the 1978 decision Regents of the Univer-
sity of California v. Bakke.21  The outcome invalidated the 
school’s special admissions program and prohibited the school 
from taking race into account as a factor in its future admissions 
decisions.22  More recently, in Grutter v. Bollinger, the Supreme 
Court held in a 5-4 vote that the Equal Protection Clause does 
not prohibit a law school’s narrowly tailored use of race in ad-
missions decisions to further a compelling interest in obtaining 
educational benefits from a diverse student body.23  However, in 
Gratz v. Bollinger, the Court found by a 6-3 vote “that the man-
ner in which the University considers the race of applicants in its 
undergraduate admissions guidelines violates” the Fourteenth 
Amendment.24  Although the later two decisions found that di-
versity may constitute a compelling state interest, the split judg-
ments demonstrate the difficulty of precisely tailoring measures 
that serve permissible diversity goals in higher education. 
Although the Supreme Court has held that affirmative ac-
tion measures may be permitted, a few states have made any 
form of affirmative action unlawful.  For example, in 1996, 
California banned affirmative action and amended the State 
Constitution to provide that the “state shall not discriminate 
against, or grant preferential treatment to any individual or 
group on the basis of race, sex, color, ethnicity, or national ori-
gin in the operation of public employment, public education, or 
public contracting.”25  In 1998, the state of Washington adopted 
a similar initiative banning affirmative action.26  In 1999, Flor-
ida also prohibited affirmative action in government employ-
ment, state contracting, and higher education.  In short, a distinct 
anti-affirmative action sentiment is alive and well, continuing to 
challenge minorities’ ability to gain access to education in the 
future. 
Following Podberesky v. Kirwin, where the Court did not 
find enough evidence of historical discrimination to justify a 
merit-based scholarship program for African Americans at the 
University of Maryland,27 the future of race-based scholarships 
continues to be in doubt.  During the Clinton Administration and 
following the Supreme Court’s determination not to review 
Hopwood v. Texas,28 the Fifth Circuit case which banned af-
firmative action in state university admissions, Judith Winston, 
General Counsel of the United States Department of Education 
(DOE), issued a letter to college and university counsel,29 which 
in part read: 
I am writing to reaffirm the Department of Educa-
tion’s position that, under the Constitution and 
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, it is per-
missible in appropriate circumstances for colleges 
and universities to consider race in making admis-
sions decisions and granting financial aid.  They 
may do so to promote diversity of their student 
body, consistent with Justice Powell’s landmark 
opinion in Regents of the University of California 
v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 311-315 (1978).  See also 
Wygant v. Jackson Bd. Of Education, 476 U.S. 
267, 286 (1986) (O’Connor, J., concurring).  They 
also may do so to remedy the continuing effects of 
discrimination by the institution itself or within 
the state or local educational system as a whole.30 
During a Democratic Administration in the White House, a 
party historically known to support affirmative action, this letter 
likely eased university administrators’ fears of action by the 
Office of Civil Rights.  However, given the present Bush Ad-
ministration’s official anti-affirmative action stance that race-
neutral alternatives will achieve diversity,31 there is low prob-
ability that the DOE will continue to allow minority-targeted 
scholarships that are not in strict compliance with stringent DOE 
guidelines.  Consequently, although school officials believe that 
minority-targeted scholarships play “an important role in the 
recruitment, retention, and graduation of racial and ethnic mi-
nority students”32 and an elimination of these scholarships will 
“attenuate their ability to recruit and retain minority students,”33 
some schools have cut raced-based scholarships and revised 
minority scholarship programs to make them race-neutral in fear 
of litigation.34  In summary, the anti-affirmative action move-
ment has essentially led to the elimination of many university 
funded and administered minority-targeted scholarship pro-
grams. Therefore, in addition to excessive undergraduate debt 
obstacles discussed earlier, reduced availability of funds for mi-
nority students to finance law school costs may also discourage 
many qualified minority candidates from pursuing a legal educa-
tion. 
LAW SCHOOLS ARE POORLY POSITIONED FOR       
COMPETITION WITH OTHER PROFESSIONAL PROGRAMS 
  With tuition growing at an alarming rate for the last twenty 
years, outpacing even the rate of inflation, law schools have 
been pressing toward the point where significant numbers of 
college graduates may decide that law school is not worth the 
economic opportunity cost and risk.  Instead, they decide it 
makes good economic sense to seek less expensive forms of 
graduate education or forgo additional credentials altogether.35   
Average law school tuition increased dramatically with pri-
vate tuition rates increasing by 86% through public resident tui-
tion increases of 141% in 2000.36  Unsurprisingly, the annual 
amount of borrowing by law students also dramatically in-
creased during this period.37  Furthermore, using loan volume, 
enrollment data, and the estimate that about 80% of law gradu-
ates borrow to finance their education, consultants calculate “an 
average total law school debt of $51,400 for each graduate of the 
class of 2000.”38  Therefore, even excluding the opportunity 
costs of lost income during the three years of law school, the 
cost of a legal education is a substantial investment. 
 “The National Association for Law Placement (NALP) 
reports that the median starting salary for all law school gradu-
ates in the class of 2000 was $51,900.”39  However, individual 
Fall 2005  9 
 starting salaries are heavily influenced by employer type or firm 
size, and therefore, vary widely from starting salaries of $34,000 
for public interest positions to $125,000 for large law firm posi-
tions.40  Furthermore, since the largest law firms predominantly 
recruit from national and top-tier regional law schools, gradu-
ates’ salaries are also heavily influenced by the type of school 
they attended.41 
The average costs of a legal education are generally about 
the same for all students.42   However, the initial expected re-
turns for minority students are generally lower because minority 
graduates “are more likely than whites to enter government, 
public interest, and business, and less likely to enter private 
practice.”43  Furthermore, even if minority graduates enter pri-
vate practice, they are more likely to work at a smaller firm.44  
In fact, NALP surveys report that almost 25% of minority 
graduates working in private practice are employed by firms 
with two to ten attorneys.45  Therefore, the average, initial return 
on investment for minority law school graduates is compara-
tively low. 
A multitude of options exist for students interested in pursu-
ing a graduate or professional degree.  For example, law schools 
are most likely to compete directly with Master of Business Ad-
ministration (MBA) programs for students.  A comparison of 
J.D. and MBA programs demonstrates that law schools are 
likely losing qualified minority applicants to other graduate and 
professional programs. 
First, most full-time MBA programs only require two years 
of study,46 compared to the full-time, three-year commitment of 
law school.  Therefore, both the actual and opportunity costs of 
pursuing an MBA are generally lower.  Second, since 1966, the 
Consortium for Graduate Study in Management (the Consor-
tium) has offered full-tuition fellowships to African American, 
Hispanic American, and Native American college graduates 
admitted to one of the organization’s member schools for busi-
ness.47  On the contrary, no comparable minority scholarship 
program exists for minority law school students.  Third, the av-
erage salary for graduates of these schools, recruited by many of 
the top investment banks, consulting firms, and corporations is 
$85,000.48  Furthermore, the cap by most accredited law schools 
on the number of hours a student can work (15 hours per week 
during the first year and 20 hours per week during the second 
and third years) negatively impacts the return on investment 
calculation.49  Conversely, a recent DOE study showed that 
“75% of MBA students overall and 61% of full-time MBA stu-
dents work more than 35 hours a week.”  Consequently, law 
schools are at a disadvantage when competing for financially 
sensitive, but highly qualified minority applicants. 
Not all potential law school applicants are interested in at-
tending business school, and other graduate programs have 
lower returns on investment.  However, considering the high 
undergraduate debt burdens that many minority students face 
and the fact that most educational institutions are no longer le-
gally allowed to offer minority-targeted scholarships, it follows 
that the mere existence of such an attractive alternative is con-
vincing some minority college graduates to apply and attend 
business school instead of law school. 
A PROPOSED SOLUTION 
One of the main obstacles for minorities in pursing a legal 
career is the low number of minorities that attain bachelor’s de-
grees.  To increase the flow of minority students into the legal 
profession, a great deal of progress can be made by boosting the 
percentage of minorities with undergraduate degrees.  According 
to U.S. Census data, only 14.3% of African Americans have 
attained a college degree at age 25 or older and the percentage 
decreases to 10.4% for Hispanics and Latinos.50  Minorities can-
not possibly consider law school without first earning a college 
degree.51  However, as this article argues, even those that clear 
this initial hurdle often face economic obstacles, which prevent 
them from pursuing a legal education. 
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibits programs 
where the university completely funds the program and selects 
the recipient, programs where the university selects the recipient 
with funding provided by a private donor, or programs where 
the university partially funds the scholarship and a private donor 
selects the recipient and provides partial funding.  The only type 
of minority scholarship not prohibited is where a private organi-
zation selects the recipients and completely funds the scholar-
ships.52 
Other professions have been more proactive in addressing 
diversity pipeline issues, and consequently, have been more suc-
cessful in diversifying their professions.  The Consortium has 
produced over 5,000 alumni during the past three decades.  In-
stead of creating diversity programs, the legal profession should 
try to duplicate the Consortium’s success by creating a similar 
program.  The economic obstacles discussed in this article 
should be addressed with an economic solution; a scholarship 
program to attract minority students into the legal profession by 
helping finance their legal educations. 
CONCLUSION 
In summary, one way to help clear the diversity pipeline 
into the practice of law is for the legal community to establish 
an organization, funded by private donors, to offer minority stu-
dents full-tuition scholarships to attend law school.  Not only 
would this solution allow minorities burdened with excessive, 
undergraduate debt to consider the option of applying to law 
school, but it would also circumvent hurdles like the unconstitu-
tionality of university-sponsored minority scholarships and the 
slow death of affirmative action.  Additionally, this solution can 
place law schools in a better position to compete with other 
graduate and professional programs for the most qualified mi-
nority students. 
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 AMERICAN INDIAN AND ALASKAN NATIVE HEALTH CARE TODAY: 
THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT’S DISPARATE TREATMENT 
LEAVES TRIBAL PEOPLE TRAILING 
 
By Deborah Broken Rope, Esq.* 
I n the United States today, the Tribal Nations’ history is hardly known by the general public.  Sadly, history text-books largely overlook the contributions that Tribal Nations 
have made in the formation of this country, as well as their role 
and status growing out of their unique legal stature today.  Their 
unique status, that of a “dependent nation,”1 has distinguished 
the legal governmental foundations between the United States 
and the tribes, which results in dual citizenship status for tribe 
members (as a United States citizen and as a tribal citizen).  This 
political citizenship status also distinguishes Indian relations and 
services as politically derived, rather than racially based.2 
Today, there are 335 Tribal Nations recognized by the fed-
eral government as having unique sovereign status3 and to whom 
the United States has a trust obligation.  This trust obligation has 
two prongs: (1) there is a United States fiduciary duty to protect 
tribes and their resources, and (2) that determining what is in a 
tribe’s best interest has been held to be vested principally with 
the Congress in exercise of its plenary power over tribal affairs.4   
The combination of the unique political citizenship, trust obliga-
tion, and stature of dependent nations has created a complicated 
legal quagmire.  This article addresses how this legal framework 
has left many Tribal Nations without appropriate medical care.  
This article also addresses common misconceptions about 
American Indian and Alaskan Native peoples that often lead to 
the mishandling of the health needs on the federal and state lev-
els. 
BACKGROUND: HOW AMERICAN INDIAN HEALTH       
BECAME A FEDERAL CONCERN 
In its pre-Constitution era, the United States’ relations with 
the Tribal Nations consisted of European colonial agreements or 
treaties with various eastern and other coastal Tribal Nations.  
European and tribal parties both benefited by utilizing interna-
tional law principles that provided rights recognized by other 
European powers, such as safe trading routes, specific point of 
entries, and land for the base of such operations.  These colonial 
agreements with Tribal Nations, with the recognition and permis-
sion to enter into such arrangements, were advanced during the 
United States’ formation5 and in subsequently adopted treaties 
with specific tribes.6 
The content of these treaties evolved over time, both in 
scope and nature.  The earliest treaties were often made to pro-
mote peace, cement military alliances against other colonial 
powers, and protect trading rights and routes.  In order to accom-
plish this, these agreements would define specific tribal lands 
and require traders and others to secure federal approval, includ-
ing payment of fees, before hunting and trading could occur 
within such delineated territories.  Later, treaties were estab-
lished to ensure that traditional tribal lands used for hunting or 
other activities, such as animal and habitat harvesting, or farm-
ing, would be protected while permanently securing some por-
tion of the land for federal ownership and later sale.  These tribal 
land cessions became the core feature of all treaties in the late 
eighteenth century. 
In return for these peaceful land cessions and the convey-
ance of hunting or other rights, Tribal Nations were to receive 
federal assistance in lieu of lost resources.  Federal promises of 
aid were expected to compensate tribes for their diminished area 
of authority and territory that had made them self-sufficient in 
the provision of food, housing material, medicinal plants, etc. 
In the last part of the Indian treaty era, when Indian lands 
previously recognized as inviolate were invaded for gold or 
homesteading purposes, agreements were entered into to mark 
the end of military conflict between the Tribal Nations and the 
United States.  Once again, these treaties became the vehicle for 
identifying the respective rights and territories belonging to the 
affected Tribal Nations and the United States, and these were 
made in exchange for promises of future federal aid. 
Treaty making with the Tribal Nations was abolished in 
18717 under pressure by the House of Representatives because 
Members wanted a voice in determining future tribal agreements.  
Future Tribal-United States agreements were accomplished 
through legislative means, with or without tribal consent.  This 
legislative method has remained the primary federal mechanism 
for resolving tribal concerns to this date, whether for tribal-
specific matters or national policy questions, such as health care 
services. 
AMERICAN INDIAN HEALTH CARE 
Several statutes have been enacted for addressing Indian 
health and related needs.  These congressional actions were un-
dertaken in fulfillment of the United States’ responsibilities to 
the tribes.  These responsibilities derive from the Federal Indian 
law principles drawn collectively from the Constitution, treaties, 
statutes, executive orders, and case law that have been enacted 
over the past three centuries. 
There are two important facts to recall in identifying federal 
American Indian policy and rights.  The first is the dual citizen-
ship status that many American Indians have.  This means that 
such Indian person carries the rights of any United States citizen 
to federal aid and protection, as well as those to benefits owed to 
their tribe under such separate legal agreements and standards. 
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 The second is that federal Indian benefits have changed as 
contemporary circumstances have grown.  Today, federal assis-
tance is structured to try to fulfill the original intent of the trea-
ties in context of current standards of care, expertise, and tech-
nology.  Federal goals are designed to ameliorate health and 
economic disadvantages and disparities as compared to the rest 
of the country.   
Previously, treaties differed as to what was proper medical 
care.  Where one tribe’s treaty would specifically require that a 
doctor be available to help treat injuries, another treaty or statute 
may indicate that the federal government is obligated to provide 
for the well-being of and public health prevention services to 
another community.  These two provisions, taken together, have 
evolved to mean that the United States has a federal health re-
sponsibility beyond the mere provision of one doctor or what the 
1800s’ perception of adequate health care was deemed to be.   
FEDERAL AND STATE HEALTH CARE ISSUES 
Given the limited knowledge of American Indian and Alas-
kan Native political, legal, and cultural attributes, the general 
public cannot fully comprehend “Indian”-related news stories.  
Such stories include articles highlighting tribal gaming, the 
socio-economic substandard conditions prevailing among many 
tribes, and tribal land and its federal “trust” protection status.  
Additionally, misperceptions are caused by the way tribal people 
participate in federal or state assistance programs, especially 
health care services, through specifically established federal 
Indian programs.  The lack of informed policy leaders and fed-
eral health advocates results in inadequate direction and re-
sources to address tribal health needs, as well as their exclusion 
or lack of access to public health care and related services. 
Today, there exists a separate federal health care delivery 
system serving federally recognized Tribal Nations - the Indian 
Health Service (IHS).  IHS was originally established as a func-
tion of the Indian Affairs agency.  The Indian Affairs agency 
was first created in the War Department.  Later, Congress reor-
ganized the Indian Affairs agency and established it within the 
Interior Department.  The federal health responsibilities were 
later transferred out of the Interior Department’s Bureau of In-
dian Affairs (BIA) to the then Department of Health, Education 
and Welfare (HEW) in 1955.8  This action was initiated, in large 
part, as a federal assimilation policy to encourage tribal people 
to view their health care rights no differently than those owed to 
non-Indian persons.  This Indian health function transfer was 
also seen as a step towards eliminating separate Indian rights.  
The IHS health care delivery system has established 50 hos-
pitals, approximately 250 outpatient clinics, and 200 health sta-
tions in tribal communities from Alaska to the east coast.9  In 
addition to these federal facilities, tribes are also operating many 
of their own health facilities, whether hospitals or clinics.  The 
growth in tribally controlled health services is supported by both 
specific Indian health legislation10 and the Indian Self Determi-
nation Act, whose goals were to strengthen tribal governing ca-
pabilities. 
Due to the nature of this federal health care system, the IHS 
program is viewed as the principal and sometimes sole health 
care avenue to be utilized by tribes.  This misperception is en-
hanced during difficult fiscal years, when states are trying to 
limit costs for those health entitlements and other programs that 
require them to serve persons who fit a certain low-income pro-
file, or who fall into some category of defined care (e.g., 65 
years of age, end stage renal disease, etc.). 
Many states carry a co-pay or matching fund requirement 
on receipt of federal health care funds for state residents who 
qualify for such care.  States are reluctant to ensure that tribal 
members fully access this care because it is perceived as an 
added drain on their state funds. Many mistakenly believe that 
tribal members do not contribute to the state tax scheme.  Gener-
ally, tribes are exempt from paying a state tax as it is unconstitu-
tional for one sovereign to tax another.  Consequently, many 
tribal members living within their tribal lands or “reservation” 
are exempt from state employee taxes when they work for their 
tribe or federal agency office located on tribal lands.  However, 
many tribal members are employed outside their reservation and 
do pay employee taxes as would any other state resident. 
      The perception that tribal persons do not pay state taxes 
and should be discouraged from using state funded services is 
only slowly being addressed through federal channels, whose 
funds often make up the nucleus of state health care assistance. 
FEDERAL AND STATE HEALTH CARE ACCESS 
Although there are several federal health policies, they are 
not always accessible for tribal members.  The federal health 
policy makers in the Executive Branch have often found it easier 
not to address the dual citizenship rights of tribal people in their 
budget formulation and policy initiatives.  However, such con-
duct is irresponsible, as there are many individuals who have 
dual health or other entitlement and assistance status.  These 
individuals are eligible to utilize multiple federal benefits that 
complement or overlap one another.  The option of having mul-
tiple benefits received, such as Veterans Affairs, Medicaid, Chil-
dren’s Medicaid, or Substance Abuse Prevention, can be no 
more difficult to administratively manage than the incorporation 
of Indian health care rights.  While the Congress and the Ad-
ministration may work to address overlapping or duplicative 
benefits, complementary services will remain. 
The federal government has also found it easier to support 
strictly state block grants rather than state-tribal block grants.  
The Administration cites that working with 335 tribes in addi-
tion to working with 50 states would be too burdensome for the 
affected federal agencies.  States are, however, permitted to 
count tribal members for inclusion in their federal application 
for funds, yet often do not provide the proportionate share of 
funds to tribal communities for assisting their members.  This 
action means that tribal people have to either seek state or 
county facilities to receive such federal or federal-state aid, or 
lobby the State for a tribal “piece of the pie.”  When a State leg-
islature has few to no Indian representatives, a plea for tribal 
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provisions is unheard.  Tribal members are not often perceived 
as integral members of such constituencies, due to low political 
voter turnout, as well as the lack of economic and political clout 
of many tribes.  Conversely, tribal members find it difficult to 
receive assistance in non-tribal settings due to discriminatory 
treatment in the lack of patient-consumer education and out-
reach, as well as the simple requirement of being welcomed to 
receive such assistance. 
  Members of Congress view news stories on Indian gaming 
and wonder why tribes are unable to assume greater financial 
responsibility.  Lack of information concerning tribal economic 
disadvantages has resulted in an inadequate foundation to suffi-
ciently grasp the gaping holes in such news coverage.  Unfortu-
nately, tribal economic circumstances in their entirety are not 
mainstream news.  This includes low tribal employment rates, 
which in turn means low tax revenues.  Tribes are unable to pro-
mote economic industry beyond gaming without their own in-
vestment or contributions, which is difficult to accomplish with-
out an existing revenue base.  For example, the tribal gaming 
market, contrary to high profile stories, is not very lucrative for 
many tribes because of their geographic isolation.  Members are 
reluctant and handicapped in efforts to provide effective policies 
when comprehensive information and education is sparse and 
not readily available. 
 The congressional committees having an interest in Indian 
health matters have increased over the years.  In the House, four 
committees can influence the debate on Indian health legisla-
tion.  These committees are the House Resources Committee 
from its Indian jurisdiction, the House Energy and Commerce 
from its public health jurisdiction, the House Governmental 
Affairs for agency organization and functions issues, and the 
House Ways and Means Committee over Medicaid and Medi-
care revenue collection and expenditure matters.  Unlike the 
House, the Senate has a separate committee to handle Indian 
legislation, the Senate Committee on Indian Affairs.  Here too, 
however, the chamber is moving towards multiple-committee 
review on pending legislative proposals by using the Senate 
Finance, Health, Education, Labor, and Pension committees.  
The result of this dispersed governance is that Indian health leg-
islation designed to strengthen health care services and tribal 
control has become mired in bureaucracy.  
INDIAN HEALTH OUTLOOK 
Tribal health status has been documented to reflect morbid-
ity and mortality levels that far exceed the national average.11  
Yet this data has not produced the necessary support for correct-
ing such obvious health disparities through federal legislative 
and funding action. 
Navigating this maze in Congress, while placating special 
interest groups and states, and negotiating with the Administra-
tion for significant investment, has proven to be a cumbersome 
and difficult task.  Tribal advocates have been attempting to pass 
the reauthorization of the Indian Health Care Improvement Act 
for the past five years to no avail.  Lack of legislative action is 
due to the cost and size of the bill, the need to allay committee 
questions over certain new program provisions, and the need to 
respond to the Administration and Members’ questions over the 
long-term benefits of this unique federal health care system.   
CONCLUSION 
As the United States advances into the twenty-first century 
of emergency preparedness, continued Middle East military con-
flicts, rising federal deficit, and trade imbalances, the federal 
government’s inclination will be to push tribal health needs to 
the side or to expect that tribal needs are met within the confines 
of state-structured systems.  Such inaction will undermine effec-
tive Indian health care services on two levels.  The first level is 
in the outreach to Indian patients and also in strengthening tribal 
governments who have the greatest interest in protecting their 
future.  Second, the deferral or hands-off approach is inconsis-
tent with the United States treaties and other legal agreements 
with the tribes.  
Tribal Nations are resourceful and American Indian/
Alaskan Native people have adapted without assimilating and 
losing their political and cultural identity over the past three 
centuries.  The new century will test both tribal resolve and the 
United States’ integrity to fulfill its obligations.  Such federal 
fiduciary fulfillment would be easier to obtain were the citizens 
of this country properly informed on who the First Nations are 
and what their roles and rights are in this great country. 
ENDNOTES 
* Deborah Ann Broken Rope is a public policy advisor in the Indian law practice 
group at Holland & Knight LLP.  Ms. Broken Rope was a Legislative Analyst with 
the Indian Health Service, Department of the Health and Human Service for several 
years.  Ms. Broken Rope earned her law degree in 2000 from American University 
Washington College of Law. 
 
1 See generally Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. 1 (1831) (distinguishing Indian 
tribes from foreign nations given their occupancy in U.S. territories to which the U.S. 
“assert title, independent of their will”). 
2 See Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 553-554 (1974) (holding that Indians are not 
members of a “discrete racial group,” but are members of a sovereign entity whose 
“lives and activities” are governed by the Bureau of Indian Affairs). 
3 List of Federally Recognized Tribes, 67 FED. REG. 134 (July 12, 2002). 
4 See Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 553, 562 (holding that Congress’ power over 
the Kiowa, Comanche, and Apache Indians is not precluded by provisions of any 
treaties). 
5 U.S. CONST. Art. I, § 8, cl. 3. 
6 Francis Paul Pucha, The History of a Political Anomaly (University of California 
Press 1997) (stating that the Treaty Era between 1778-1868 resulted in 370 ratified 
treaties). 
7 Indian Appropriation Act, 16 U.S.C. § 566 (1871). 
8 1955 Transfer Act. 
9 FY 2006 Budget Justifications, U.S. Department of Health and Human Services 
Indian Health Service, available at http://www.ihs.gov/AdminMngrResources/
Budget/FY_2006_Budget_Justification.asp. 
10 E.g., Indian Sanitation Facilities Act, PL 86-121; Indian Health Care Improvement 
Act, 25 U.S.C. 1601; Indian Alcohol And Substance Abuse Prevention And Treat-
ment, 25 U.S.C. 26; Special Diabetes Program for Indians, 42 U.S.C. 254c-3(c)(2). , 
11 Trends in Indian Health, 2000-2001, Division of Program Statistics, Indian Health 
Service (IHS), U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS), available 
at  http://www.ihs.gov/NonMedicalPrograms/IHS_Stats/IHS_HQ_Publications.asp. 
 Fall 2005  15 
C hicano Attorney Nicolás Vaca’s fascination with the exponential growth of the Latino population in the United States compelled him to conduct a daring study 
of past tensions and future problems between the African 
American community and the Latino community in The Pre-
sumed Alliance: The unspoken conflict between latinos and 
blacks and what it means for America.  Vaca begins with the 
proposition that there is an idealized, assumed alliance between 
the African American and Latino communities, an assumption  
often made by Latinos and the liberal White community.  Vaca 
deconstructs the myth of a “brown-black” coalition, identifying 
prejudice, zero-sum employment competition, and political 
competition as factors driving the two communities apart. 
Vaca’s identification and definition of each group is prob-
lematic.  By favoring the terms Latinos and Blacks, “black” and 
“white” Latinos are lost within the scope of these terms.  In a 
recent interview, Vaca acknowledged that African Americans 
are aware of the problem with the term Latino.  Furthermore, he 
explained that African Americans often deconstruct the term 
Latino to show that if Latinos were identified by country, then 
African Americans would still be the largest minority despite the 
ambiguous nature of being “African” American.1  Also particu-
larly relevant, but conspicuously missing, is a discussion of the 
Latino construct and the assumption that all Latinos can be 
lumped together as a cultural and political group.  A discussion 
of the tensions and divisions among Latino groups would add to 
Vaca’s analysis. Further complicating the Latino construct, Vaca 
overwhelmingly focuses on Mexicans and their history.  Al-
though Mexicans do comprise about 58% of the total Latino 
population, he glosses over the other 32 countries and 11 de-
pendent political units that comprise Latin America.  Even 
though Vaca intends on representing all Latinos in his analysis, 
it often seems he uses the label Latino and the label Mexican 
interchangeably.   
Vaca does an admirable job of attempting to balance his 
analysis of “brown-black” politics.  He cites the failure of Afri-
can Americans to vote for Cuban candidate Antonio Villarai-
gosa in Los Angeles to balance the Latinos’ failure to vote for 
African American candidate Lee Brown in Houston.  In addi-
tion, he contrasts the African American community’s control in 
Compton with the Cuban dominance in Miami.  There are also 
examples of racial stereotyping and antipathy on both sides.  
Despite these seemingly objective examples, however, there is 
an underlying disapproving message to the African American 
community.  In his interview, Vaca affirmed this message: “I 
have repeatedly stated that my book is far more significant for 
African Americans than it is for Latinos.  The release of every 
new survey by the U.S. Census reveals a Latino growth trajec-
tory that continues to exceed that of the African American popu-
lation.  The refusal of the African American notables to address 
the conflict between the two groups is done at their own peril 
and that of the larger African American community.”2  He sup-
ported this statement by revealing that none of the prominent 
African American scholars who received his manuscript re-
sponded or showed any interest in giving input.3 
Yet while Vaca chastises the African American community 
for their lack of support, he glazes over several important prob-
lems.  Vaca discusses briefly the comparative lack of civic par-
ticipation by those in the Latino community who can vote.  He 
does not discuss the impact of undocumented immigrants on the 
civic participation statistics, specifically that a great number of 
Latinos in the United States are unable to legally vote.  Al-
though the growth of the Latino community is noteworthy, the 
population statistics only become pivotal when they translate 
into votes.  Notably, Vaca admits that when Latino candidates 
lost by a small margin, the loss was caused by a lack of Latino 
voter participation, not necessarily the lack of support from the 
African American community.  Perhaps before focusing on La-
tino population growth patterns, there should be a discussion of 
the growth of political participation by Latinos.   
The book’s shortcomings do not erase the fact that the dy-
namics between African Americans and Latinos are a growing 
force that must be addressed.  Vaca does not mince words and 
he states what many people are afraid to say in these days of 
political correctness.  Readers will either immediately agree or 
immediately disagree with his conclusions, but either way, 
Vaca’s book performs an important role as a catalyst for the 
discussion of the political reality of “brown” versus “black.” 
THE PRESUMED ALLIANCE: THE UNSPOKEN CONFLICT BETWEEN 
LATINOS AND BLACKS AND WHAT IT MEANS FOR AMERICA 
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SPOTLIGHT ON KEVIN JENNINGS: 
EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR AND CO-FOUNDER OF THE                    
GAY, LESBIAN, AND STRAIGHT EDUCATION NETWORK (GLSEN) 
 
By Lydia Edwards*  
W e chose Kevin Jennings for the spotlight in this issue because of his dedication 
to creating a discourse that empowers 
all people gay and straight to do some-
thing to protect our youth.   As co-
founder of GLSEN, Mr. Jennings has 
helped create a movement that all peo-
ple can rally around: protecting and educating America’s chil-
dren.   Recently, The Modern American was able to interview 
him to give us his thoughts on a variety of topics within the 
movement including: being “locked in;” keeping your head up; 
the generation gap; race and diversity; gay high schools; and 
starting a discourse.   
LOCKED IN 
In a recent talk at Holland and Knight’s Boston Office, 
you quoted Virginia Woolf’s reaction to being locked out of a 
library: “I thought how unpleasant it is to be locked out; and I 
thought how it is worse, perhaps, to be locked in.”1 How does 
homophobia “lock in” American teens? 
 
Jennings: Susan Pharr wrote a book called Homophobia: A 
Weapon of Sexism and in it she notes 
that sexism is about gender role con-
straints and homophobia is the weapon 
we hit people over the head with when 
they break out of those constraints.  We 
call boys who express their emotions 
“fairies” and girls who are assertive a 
“bitch” or “dyke.”  This is particularly 
constraining for men.  There is such a 
taboo about exploring a part of their 
nature that cries because you are called 
a faggot and that’s the worst.  Also 
powerful women are also seen as lesbians.  For example look at 
newest book about Hillary Clinton, The Truth About Hillary: 
What She Knew, When She Knew It, and How Far She'll Go to 
Become President by Edward Klein.  These labels are used to 
constrain people in roles that are unnatural. Women are assertive 
and men are sensitive.   
KEEPING YOUR HEAD UP 
With all the focus on marriage rights and the current 
reaction from state governments to change their Constitu-
tions, do you think protecting gay children has a chance? 
 
Jennings: As progressives we have a tendency to look at the 
glass as half empty.  My mom used to say, “the only person who 
likes change is a baby with a wet diaper.”  The intense backlash 
we experience today is due to developments in the past two 
years.  Sodomy laws were struck down by the Supreme Court 
and the Massachusetts Supreme Court granted equal marriage 
rights.    
Movements for social justice follow patterns.  The more 
visible you, are the more progress you make, the more you are 
attacked.  The more you are attacked the more people will take a 
stand.  The backlash is hateful but then people will stand up.  I 
don’t think history is linear.  For every two steps forward you 
take one step back.  Some people will be very adamant to this 
change.  People were getting blown up in churches when the 
civil rights movement was most successful.  Compare the world 
we live in now to the world I was born into 1963, where segrega-
tion was prevalent and homosexuality was “treated” with electric 
shock therapy.  So I don’t find it a depressing thought, What did 
you think was going to happen?  We should not be discouraged 
because our success is inevitable.   
COMPARING THE MOVEMENTS 
You mentioned the civil rights movement, how is the 
LGBT equality movement and the civil rights movement 
comparable?  Are they the same? What about the role of 
young people?  
 
Jennings: First, as a history teacher I am often bothered by 
people that say that the black experience and the gay experience 
are exactly the same.  I think the experience of gay people is 
most like that of the deaf.  Like sexual-
ity, deafness is not immediately seen.  
Both are born into families that cannot 
“communicate” with them.  Black chil-
dren are most likely born in black fami-
lies with a preexisting dialogue.  
       Second, despite our differences, 
Americans believe that all children 
deserve protection and education.  
Those are areas around which people 
who feel very different can come to-
gether.  GLSEN was the first gay rights 
organization to put “straight” into our title and 33% of our ex-
ecutive board are straight.  We bring people around a common 
title, like white and black parents united around wanting educa-
tion for children.   
Third, the children are pushing us.  For example, in the 
South young people like Jon Lewis were only 18 or 19 at the 
time of the civil rights movement and Martin Luther King Jr. 
was only 26 when he led the Montgomery Bus Boycott.  Young 
people were willing to take risks that their elders weren’t willing 
to or able to take.  In our case, young people came up with the 
day of silence, in which today half a million people take part.2  
Young people push elders and demand more.  They say, “hey 
movement get your act together.”  There has never been a suc-
cessful movement in America that didn’t have young people 
front and center.  It was the influence of the young at a critical 
point that lead the civil rights movement to victory. That is why I 
don’t get worried about setbacks.  Because it is inevitable we are 
Movements for social justice 
follow patterns.  The more 
visible you are, the more     
progress you make, the more 
you are attacked. 
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going to win; there is no doubt in my mind. 
GENERATION GAP 
A recent Times magazine article about young gay people 
noted that they seem to see themselves as not really “gay” but 
just wanting to fit in.  It’s as if many don’t see themselves as 
part of a movement. 
 
Jennings: I think the article oversimplified the situation.  
There is a generation gap in every community.  It’s a huge factor 
and it makes a big difference.  For example, there is a huge dif-
ference between the African American youth and the LGBT 
youth because African Americans are raised by black people and 
whatever generational issues that may exist there is still a dia-
logue.  There is no venue for LBGT youth because they are not 
raised by gay people, so they don’t have much contact with older 
gay people.  Young people are excluded from many of the ven-
ues designed for gay people like bars.  So a 45 year old gay man 
and 15 year old gay student don’t really talk a lot.  
Today’s youth is the first generation who are coming out 
while still in adolescence and demanding for the same adoles-
cence as their straight counterparts.  You were biding your time 
in my generation, waiting to start you life.  I am 42 and today 
kids at 17 are saying, “I want my life now.”  “I am not willing to 
wait for a means of escape.”  It’s very exciting, because why 
should they have to wait to start their life.  They want to go to 
prom, have dates and tell their friends about the crushes they 
have. 
DIVERSITY WITHIN THE LGBT MOVEMENT 
Essentially where is it?  Many people of the LGBT com-
munity of color often criticize mainstream LGBT organiza-
tions for leaving them out. 
 
Jennings: That is a legitimate criticism; the gay rights 
movement is no different than any other.  It would be nice to 
think that if you are a gay white person you could liken your 
struggle to a straight black person.  But you can be racist, and 
straight black people can be just as homophobic.  How you ex-
perience oppression is not how someone else experiences theirs.  
At GLSEN’s national student leadership program we made a 
goal that at least 50% of our leaders have to be students of color, 
transgendered, or straight allies.  At least 60% of our leaders are 
that.  In order to reach diversity you have to practice it from the 
very onset. 
 
Well if diversity is so great what do you think of schools 
like Harvey Milk, an all gay high school in New York?   
 
Jennings: I think that at this juncture it is a tragic necessity.  
The students otherwise wouldn’t get a high school diploma be-
cause they dropped out of other schools because they were tired 
of being beaten up.  It’s a tragedy; every child should feel free to 
go to school get an education without fear.  That we even have to 
consider this to make sure some kids get a diploma is a tragedy.  
The Harvey Milk people say the same thing.  They look for the 
day they can close their doors because a school like theirs is no 
longer necessary.  
No one is asking what’s wrong with mainstream schools 
where these students can’t get an education.  These students have 
already been segregated out of that system. If mainstream 
schools were doing their job we wouldn’t need this.  At GLSEN 
we believe in bringing people together.  If you take all of the gay 
kids out of the schools, how do you expect to teach people about 
getting along with others who are different. 
STARTING A DISCOURSE 
So then is GLSEN targeting the youth who are not quite 
political or have no intention of becoming political but need a 
voice? 
 
Jennings: Eleanor Roosevelt once said that “Where do uni-
versal human rights begin?  In small places close to home.”  
Many get involved in politics when they see injustice and 
wrongs in their lives.  They then see that it is connected to a sys-
tem and then they begin to get involved at a larger scale.  They 
get involved because of name calling and bullying.  They start to 
understand that it’s because elected officials don’t make policies 
that protect young people.  To solve problems in their lives they 
have to attack systems that cause them.  It’s about inequitable 
systems that perpetuate injustices on groups of people. 
 
So we are inspired now, but how do we start a discourse 
when all I hear about is sin and sex acts? 
 
Jennings: First ask what is the point in America we are try-
ing to create?  There is an obvious huge gap between what it 
seeks to be and what it is.  We seek to be a country where people 
are not the same.  I may not like it, but you have a constitutional 
right to think I am going to hell.  But you don’t have a right to 
stop me from exercising my constitutional rights.  
What lowers the blood pressure is that we are not saying 
there is one way to think. We say regardless of what you think 
you have to treat people with respect.  You don’t have to like, 
approve, or think I’m moral.  Religion is clearly a choice yet we 
protect people from religious persecution.  You have to respect 
people even if you think they are wrong.  We have Christians, 
Jews, and Hindus in this country and we recognize they have the 
right to be, despite some beliefs that a particular person is going 
to hell.  We have somehow managed to figure that out for relig-
ion.  We need that for sexual orientation.  
People need to understand that is what we are trying to do 
and that it is American. 
 
Kevin Jennings received his MBA from New York Univer-
sity; MS from Columbia; and BA at Harvard University.  He 
also the author of five books and his sixth book is due out in 
the Fall of 2006 on Beacon Press.  If you have any questions 
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1 Virginia Woolf, A Room of One’s Own. 
2 See Dayofsilence.org  (explaining The Day of Silence, a project of the 
Gay, Lesbian and Straight Education Network (GLSEN) in collabora-
tion with the United States Student Association (USSA), is a student-
led day of action where those who support making anti-LGBT bias 
unacceptable in schools take a day-long vow of silence to recognize 
and protest the discrimination and harassment -- in effect, the silenc-
ing -- experienced by LGBT students and their allies).   
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PREPARING FOR AMERICA’S FUTURE:  
LATINOS IN EDUCATION 
 
By Roopa Nemi* 
L atinos represent the largest minority in the United States and their educational success directly impacts the achievements of the nation as a whole.1  However, a 
recent report noted Latinos generally lag behind in education 
when compared to other racial or ethnic groups.  This article will 
analyze reports on Latinos in education and will conclude with 
the federal government’s response to the issue. 
LATINOS IN EDUCATION 
According to a recent Pew Hispanic Center report, Latinos 
are experiencing an increase in the proportion of school-aged 
youths in their population.2  In the next twenty-five years, this 
population is expected to grow by 82%.  Furthermore, Latino 
enrollment in higher education institutions has been growing.3  
Higher education includes the traditional method of attending 
college full time after graduating high school and the nontradi-
tional approach of working for some time before attending col-
lege or enrolling at a community college.4  The report shows that 
in general, a majority of Latino youths adopt the nontraditional 
approach.5  While there is an increasing number of Latinos at-
taining an undergraduate degree, only 9% earn an associate’s and 
6%  earn a bachelor’s degrees.  These numbers fall behind other 
ethnic groups, such as African Americans, of whom 11% and 9% 
earn associate and bachelor’s degrees, respectively.6  
The Latino parents surveyed in the report identify several 
reasons as to why Latino students are not performing as well as 
their peers:  (1) the schools are too quick to label Latino kids as 
having learning problems; (2) too many non-Latino teachers may 
not know how to address cultural differences; (3) many Latino 
students may have weaker English language skills; (4) stereo-
types may have perpetuated teachers’ 
lower expectation of them; and (5) par-
ents may not push their children to 
work harder.7  Interestingly, the major-
ity of whites and African Americans 
surveyed attributed Latino students’ 
performance to weak English skills.8   
Latinos know that higher educa-
tion is very important to success.9  
Similar to other ethnic groups, Latinos point to money as the 
main reason why many students either do not attend college or 
fail to finish.10  In addition, they also point to discrimination and 
the desire to stay close to family as other reasons for not attend-
ing college.11  Such beliefs may help explain why many Latino 
students choose the nontraditional path of attending a community 
college nearby or working to support the family.12  
 
FEDERAL LEGISLATION AND JUDICIAL ACTION 
Federal legislation should strive to increase access to educa-
tion for Latinos.13  The Higher Education Act (HEA) authorizes 
federal programs to support access to higher education.14  In 
terms of institutional support, there are two programs directly 
serving Latino students, the Developing Hispanic Serving Insti-
tutions (HSIs) and the Minority Science and Engineering Im-
provement Program (MSEIP).15  Both programs operate similarly 
to provide grants to institutions that either have large Latino 
populations or try to attract more Latinos into specific fields.16  
The grants provide funds for institutional development through 
initiatives to improve the quality of education and faculty devel-
opment.17  These types of programs have been quite successful 
as evidenced by the fact that 45% of Latinos in higher education 
are enrolled in an HSI.18 
Another way the HEA attempts to increase access to higher 
education for Latinos is through preparatory programs such as 
the Gaining Early Awareness and Readiness for Undergraduate 
Program (GEAR-UP).19  This program seeks to prepare middle 
school students in low-income neighborhoods for higher educa-
tion.20  The program works with the students through high 
schools to establish partnerships with postsecondary institutions, 
which may result in college scholarships for the students.21  
While this program does not aim directly at Latino students, 
studies have shown that many Latinos have benefited from 
GEAR-UP.22 
The most significant way the HEA seeks to help minorities 
is through grant and loan programs.23  This aspect is extremely 
important considering that Latino parents identified money as the 
main obstacle to their children’s enrollment in college.24  Such 
grants include Pell grants, federal sup-
plemental educational opportunity 
grants, and additional programs for 
students that have families involved in 
seasonal farm work.25  While the fed-
eral government offers a variety of 
funding, Latinos tend to receive the 
lowest average amount compared to 
other ethnic groups26 regardless of the 
form of aid.27   As a result, these programs have not fully ad-
dressed a need that, according to Latinos, is the main reason their 
children do not attain higher education.28  Future education re-
form needs to address the deficiency of funding to remedy the 
larger problem. 
Undocumented immigrants create special issues when evalu-
ating the needs of Latinos and education.29  While not all illegal 
aliens are Latinos and vice versa, a sizable population of foreign-
Latinos tend to receive the 
lowest amount of federal aid. 
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born Latinos remains undocumented.30  Proponents of the re-
form measures addressing the needs of illegal aliens, specifically 
their children’s needs, point to the United States Supreme Court 
decision in Plyler v. Doe31 as a significant step forward.  The 
Supreme Court invalidated a Texas statute that prevented illegal 
alien children from attaining a free public education.32  The 
Court reasoned that children could “affect neither their parents’ 
decisions nor their own status.”33 Additionally, the Court noted 
the value of education while stressing that, as a nation, it is im-
portant not to discriminate against the children since most of 
them will remain in the United States.34  
With this in mind, Senator 
Orrin Hatch (R-Utah) drafted the 
DREAM Act and introduced it to 
the 108th Congress.35  This legisla-
tion sought to address the hardships 
faced by undocumented youths 
brought to the United States by their 
parents who have since grown up in 
the United States, continued their 
education in the United States, and 
have otherwise been model citi-
zens.36  Specifically, the DREAM 
Act would grant legal residence to 
certain youths for up to six years in 
which the student must graduate 
from a two-year college and com-
plete two years at a four-year institution or serve in the military 
for at least two years.37  Gaining legal status has significant im-
plications, the most important of which for education is the op-
portunity to receive in-state tuition.38  Generally, states are 
strongly discouraged from providing such tuition to illegal 
aliens, but the DREAM Act strives to restore this capability.39  
Opponents have dubbed the bill as a hidden amnesty pro-
gram under the guise of education.40  They fear that the DREAM 
Act will cause increased competition with scarce opportunities 
to attend college to the detriment of United States citizens.41  
Kathy McKee, State Director for Protect Arizona Now and op-
ponent of the DREAM Act, articulates her opposition to this Act 
by stating “it is placing a burden on the American taxpayers that 
is not fair… Most colleges are raising tuition now, limiting en-
rollment more and more.  I don't think we need to add to the 
problem of having more people wanting higher education when 
there's really no money for it.”42 
Members of the Latino community have also voiced their 
opposition to the DREAM Act.43  They question the feasibility 
of attending college when compared with the option of serving 
in the military.44  As discussed earlier, Latinos tend to bear the 
responsibility of supporting their families, and therefore, may 
not have sufficient time or monetary resources to perform the 
educational requirements the DREAM Act requires in lieu of 
military service.45  More importantly, many Latino students are 
reluctant to assume debt in the face of rising tuition costs, which 
also diminishes the possibility of attending college.46  Conse-
quently, some members of the Latino community see military 
service as the only viable option.47  They support their opinions 
by highlighting the Pentagon’s publicly stated goal of doubling 
the number of Latinos in the armed forces by 2007.48  In addi-
tion, the army has new recruitment tactics including campaigns 
in public schools and colleges where Latinos feel that their stu-
dents would be most vulnerable to recruitment.49  While many 
Latinos support the educational provisions of the DREAM Act, 
they worry that a majority of the Latino youth will inevitably 
have to choose military service.  As an opponent stated “[d]oes 
our desire to protect undocumented chil-
dren by securing their legal residency 
override the likelihood that many of 
these children will fill the lowest ranks 
of the U.S. military?  Is getting a green 
card worth the risk of young Latinos and 
Latinas losing their lives on foreign 
soil?”50 
       Senator Feinstein, co-sponsor of the 
DREAM Act, argues “[t]he DREAM 
Act would benefit young people who 
have earned the privilege to remain in 
the United States… it does not offer am-
nesty, nor is it an entitlement.”51  Some 
members of the Latino community have 
expressed their support for the bill.52  
Latino students have participated in protests and mock gradua-
tion ceremonies where they recount their personal experiences 
and success stories.53  As one student declared, reinforcing what 
the Supreme Court has already held, “[w]e are not criminals… 
we only want better lives… we want to give to society.”54  De-
spite the opposition, the proposed legislation received a favor-
able response in the Senate.55  Sponsors plan to reintroduce the 
bill in 2005 and expect as much support as it received in 2004.56 
CONCLUSION 
Ultimately, the main problem facing Latinos in accessing 
education is a lack of money.57  Latinos, whether native- or for-
eign-born, state that rising costs prevent their children from ob-
taining a higher education.58  While the federal legislature has 
implemented programs trying to deal with this very issue, it has 
fallen short in addressing the specific needs of the Latino com-
munity.59  This is evident from statistics showing that Latinos 
receive the least amount of all the various type of financial aid.60  
While legislation like the DREAM Act seeks to improve the 
situation for undocumented Latinos and illegal aliens in general, 
the government still needs to focus directly on the Latino com-
munity as a whole.61  Overall, the Latino community is improv-
ing in the field of education, an improvement from which the 
nation as a whole will benefit. 
 
“Does our desire to protect     
undocumented children by       
securing their legal residency 
override the likelihood that 
many of these children will fill 
the   lowest ranks of the U.S. 
military? Is getting a green 
card worth the risk of young 
Latinos and Latinas losing 
their lives on foreign soil?” 
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SURVIVING RACISM AND SEXUAL ASSAULT:  
AMERICAN INDIAN WOMEN LEFT UNPROTECTED 
 
By Talib Ellison* 
I n 1829, President Andrew Jackson promised that American Indians would have sovereignty “as long as grass grows or water runs.”1  Nearly 175 years later, President Jackson’s 
promise still maintains the hollow sentiments that it embodied 
then.2  Sovereignty, in the sense of legal autonomy,3 does not 
exist in “Indian Country.”4  Rather, tribal courts and govern-
ments lack the authority to implement and enforce laws regulat-
ing criminal offenses when non-tribal members commit offenses 
on tribal land.5  One of the most alarming displays of this prob-
lematic scheme is the incredible rate of sexual assault against 
American Indian females by non-Indian males.  
The inconsistent governing statutes and judicial interpreta-
tions of state and federal laws concerning both tribal sovereignty 
and criminal jurisdiction in Indian Country are responsible for 
the staggering rate of sexual assaults occurring on tribal lands 
between non-tribal assailants and American Indian female vic-
tims.6  Despite facially maintaining concurrent jurisdiction with 
both the state and the federal governments,7 Indian Country is a 
ward of the United States, with the federal government shaping 
and limiting tribal sovereignty within the frame of Congressional 
and judicial discretion.8  As such, the concurrent jurisdictional 
scheme prevents tribal governments and courts from having the 
complete autonomy to create and enforce their own governing 
laws.9 
This essay evaluates how the complicated maintenance of 
concurrent jurisdiction, coupled with the doctrines of limited 
sovereignty in Indian Country and federal trust responsibility, is 
effectively responsible for American Indian victims of sexual 
assault frequently lacking a judicial remedy.  Specifically, 
American Indian women face elaborate hurdles in their pursuit of 
justice when the assailant is a non-Indian and the assault occurs 
on tribal land.  This essay first introduces the historical context 
of sexual assault on tribal land, tribal sovereignty doctrine, tribal 
court authority, and the federal trust responsibility.  Second, it 
argues that an unclear Congressional delegation of tribal sover-
eignty, facilitated by the lack of adherence to the trust responsi-
bility, creates a high level of sexual assault in Indian Country.  
Third, it also argues that this unconstitutional jurisdictional 
scheme simultaneously denies American Indian women equal 
protection of the law, violates the federal trust responsibility to 
protect the best interest of American Indians, inhibits tribal self-
governance, and results in the high level of sexual assault in In-
dian Country.  Finally, this essay suggests that a decline in sex-
ual assault rates in Indian Country will occur if the United States 
adheres to the true nature of the federal trust responsibility by 
sincerely re-evaluating the dependent sovereignty status of In-
dian nations as related to concurrent jurisdiction. 
SEXUAL ASSAULT IN INDIAN COUNTRY 
 One out of every three American Indian women is a victim 
of rape at least once in her lifetime.10  Approximately 7.2 out of 
1,000 American Indian women fall victim to sexual assault, com-
pared to 1.9 out of 1,000 of all other races in the United States.11  
Some American Indians and national researchers believe that 
even though statistics reflect an alarming rate of sexual violence 
in Indian Country, the rate of sexual assault is not truly represen-
tative of the problem due to underreporting.12   
The symptoms facilitating sexual assault are similar for 
women of all races, such as general negative social attitudes to-
ward women, the relative lack of power held by women in soci-
ety in contrast to men, and the traditional sexual subjugation of 
women.13  American Indian women, however, experience unique 
socio-economic disadvantages as they not only endure sexism by 
male-dominated tribal councils, but also struggle to overcome 
common social problems that accompanied the imposition of the 
white patriarchal paradigm during colonialism.14  Furthermore, 
as victims of sexual assault, there are specific cultural impedi-
ments that obstruct their access to helpful resources.15  The con-
sequences of these barriers are often uniquely worse than those 
of their female counterparts of other ethnicities.16  The estab-
lished disenfranchisement of American Indians, and particularly 
the treatment of American Indian women by colonizers, is the 
root of this disadvantage.17  This past oppression has led to se-
vere present day repercussions for American Indians, and spe-
cifically for American Indian women. 
In March 2004, responding to reports of sexual assault in 
Indian Country, Senators Tom Daschle and Tim Johnson called 
for legal reform to increase funding for tribes as part of an ag-
gressive effort to combat the rates of sexual assault in Indian 
Country.18  The senators criticized cuts in tribal programs fund-
ing, and challenged President Bush to re-evaluate the needs of 
Indian Country.  The federal government, however, has yet made 
an effort to correct the problems that the Senators’ addressed in 
their letter.   
THE FEDERAL TRUST RESPONSIBILITY 
In practice, the federal trust responsibility requires Congress 
to allocate tribal funds directly to protect tribal lands, to enhance 
tribal resources and self-government, to ensure the welfare of the 
tribes and people, and to guarantee American Indian use and 
enjoyment of tribal lands.19  The trust principles governing pri-
vate fiduciaries equally apply to the federal government’s trust 
duty to the tribes.20  Courts maintain that a “fiduciary relation-
ship necessarily arises when the Government assumes elaborate 
control over resources . . .  and property belonging to Indians” 
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and the elements of the common-law trust exist.21  Essentially, 
as a trustee to tribal land and money, the federal government is 
bound to a strict duty of undivided loyalty under the tenets of 
trust principles.22   
Nonetheless, no single explicit statutory definition of the 
federal trust responsibility exists.23  Rather, the central body of 
contemporary federal trust policy derives from a composite of 
the Constitution, legislative enactments, tribal treaties with the 
American government, and most importantly, judicial deci-
sions.24  The courts utilize all of these sources of law in deter-
mining the parameters of the federal government’s duties.    
TRIBAL SOVEREIGNTY 
The foundational framework for the interpretation of Indian 
law and tribal sovereignty is in Johnson v McIntosh,25 the first of 
three opinions written by Chief Justice Marshall in the nine-
teenth century.26  The Court in Johnson approved of the federal 
government’s claim of title to American Indian land, despite the 
absence of agreement or consent from American Indians.27  
Chief Justice Marshall determined that rather than being abso-
lute sovereign entities empowered with inherent rights such as 
the right to transfer title to land, tribes were “dependent, dimin-
ished sovereigns.”28  Marshall echoed this interpretation of tribal 
sovereignty in his second opinion written in Cherokee Nation v. 
Georgia.29   
Finally, in Worcester v. Georgia, the Court slightly broke 
with precedent by elaborating that Indian tribes are “distinct, 
independent political communities, retaining their original natu-
ral rights” in matters of local self-government.30  Essential to the 
Court’s holding is the narrow construction of tribal independ-
ence as limited to “local self-government.”31  In the aftermath of 
the Marshall trilogy, Indian tribes maintain sovereignty only 
over affairs that occur within their tribal communities, and only 
over affairs among American Indians.   
CONCURRENT CRIMINAL JURISDICTION SCHEME IN   
INDIAN COUNTRY 
In general, tribal courts retain concurrent jurisdiction with 
both federal and state courts to enforce laws in Indian Country, 
with the federal courts reserving jurisdiction to enforce all fed-
eral criminal laws.32  However, tribal courts traditionally have 
criminal jurisdiction only over offenses that Indians commit in 
Indian Country.  In 1834, Congress enacted the General Crimes 
Act, extending federal criminal jurisdiction to crimes between 
Indians and non-Indians.33  The Act generally reinforces the 
fundamental concept of tribal self-government by asserting that 
crimes between Indians fall within the exclusive jurisdiction of 
tribal governments.  Additionally, the Act upholds the notion of 
tribal sovereignty by explicitly excluding federal criminal juris-
diction over Indian offenders tried and punished by the tribal 
courts.34   
Congress further expanded its jurisdiction and enacted the 
Major Crimes Act, creating federal criminal jurisdiction over 
more serious felonies that Indians commit in Indian Country.35  
The Major Crimes Act also only permits tribal courts to impose 
punishments of a maximum of one year imprisonment and a fine 
of five thousand dollars.36  Perceiving a lack of proficient law 
enforcement in Indian Country, Congress subsequently passed 
Public Law 280.37  This legislation requires six states to assume 
criminal and civil jurisdiction over all or part of Indian Country 
within their borders, and provides that both the General Crimes 
Act and the Major Crimes Act are not applicable in these six 
states.  According to Public Law 280, these states retain author-
ity over non-Indians in Indian country, including crimes that 
non-Indians commit against Indians on tribal lands.  A lack of 
clarity in the law, however, results in an interpretation of the 
General Crimes Act that preempts state criminal jurisdiction 
over non-Indians committing crimes against Indians, thereby 
preserving federal criminal jurisdiction over these cases.38  
THE TRUST RESPONSIBILITY DYNAMIC IN                  
INDIAN COUNTRY 
There are two overlapping factors predominantly responsi-
ble for the lack of protection of American Indian women.  First, 
Congress’ consistent violation of its trust responsibility con-
stricts the level of sovereignty afforded to tribal governments 
and courts and simultaneously increases the need for tribal de-
pendence on the federal government.39  Second, jurisdictional 
confusions and enforcement flaws due to the changing roles of 
the federal and state governments, result in the hindrance of 
tribal justice system development, deny American Indian 
women equal protection of the laws, and further exacerbate In-
dian Country struggles to achieve sovereignty.40  Consequently, 
the everyday social experiences of American Indians, and spe-
cifically American Indian women, reveals a continued plight, 
which exists on the periphery of American consciousness.  
THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT HABITUALLY ABANDONS 
ITS TRUST RESPONSIBILITIES 
The President and Congress seem to regard their duties un-
der the trust agreement as an optional, rather than as a manda-
tory legal obligation.  The federal government must either begin 
fulfilling its trust duties or take specific measures to divest tribal 
funds by returning what belongs to American Indians.  In other 
words, the federal government would have to make appropriate 
reparations for damages caused as a result of its fiduciary 
breach.41  As the trustee and the possessor of title to Indian lands 
and monies, the federal government has the obligation of pro-
tecting the interests of Indian Country.42  However, past govern-
mental actions reflect an abandonment of its obligations to the 
trust beneficiaries, i.e., to American Indians.43  In having a 
“dependent nation” within its borders, undoubtedly the federal 
government’s ancillary motivation is to maintain maximum con-
trol of Indian Country.44  To effectuate this goal, the federal 
government entered into a trust, whereby it ascertains physical 
control of tribal lands, then asserts its constitutionally-vested 
 authority to restrict tribal sovereignty and self-governance.45 
Regardless of the federal government’s motives and consti-
tutionally-vested authority, the law recognizes that when a trus-
tee fails to administer a trust pursuant to the terms of the agree-
ment, a breach results, subjecting the trustee to liability for dam-
ages as well as other available remedies.46  In Seminole Nation 
v. United States, the U.S. Supreme Court determined that the 
federal government disbursed tribal funds to the local tribal gov-
ernment, completely aware that the government was not allocat-
ing funds according to its appropriate, intended purposes.47  The 
Court reasoned that the trust requires the federal government to 
strictly adhere to its obligations as Indian Country’s fiduciary 
agent, utilizing tribal money and land to advance social develop-
ment and promote tribal self-governance.48  The federal govern-
ment’s behavior in Indian Country demonstrates its continued 
failure to provide trust funding necessary to raise the standard of 
living and social well-being of American Indians.  In addition, 
misallocation of money, as well as insufficient or declining lev-
els of funding, force impoverished female victims of sexual as-
sault to struggle with limited options and resources for help.49   
In a similar vein, Congress passed the Violence Against 
Women Act (VAWA) to provide federal protection to women as 
victims of violent crimes.50  Although some provisions in 
VAWA addressed American Indian women specifically, these 
sections did not offer decisive solutions to the serious problem 
of sexual assault faced by American Indian women.51  There-
fore, during VAWA’s reauthorization in 2000, there was an ini-
tiative to create a discretionary grant program to support non-
profit tribal coalitions that provide services for victims of sexual 
assault and domestic violence in Indian Country.52  In determin-
ing that only tribal governments could receive federal funding, 
the Department of Justice’s (DOJ) Office on Violence Against 
Women informed the tribal coalitions that they were ineligible 
to apply for funding.53  The tribal governments, however, did 
not receive direct funding from the DOJ.  Therefore, these tribal 
coalitions will likely dissolve because tribal governments lack 
sufficient funding to allocate money to these programs.   
Congress acknowledged that funding shortfalls are likely 
the biggest impediment to tribal self-determination.54  If tribal 
self-determination and self-governance truly are goals that the 
federal government shares with Indian Country, then the govern-
ment should not simply recognize that adequate funding makes 
independence possible, but actually allocate money to these pro-
grams.55  In violation of trust responsibilities, however, the 
President and Congress continue to fall short of providing 
“resources necessary to effectively address or remedy [such] 
longstanding problems in Indian Country” as disproportionate 
rates of sexual assault.56   
THE FEDERAL TRUST AS A JUSTIFICATION FOR        
CONCURRENT JURISDICTION 
These cyclic arguments about how concurrent jurisdiction 
preserves tribal autonomy, and how the United States’ policy of 
recognizing tribal sovereignty and self-government demands the 
existence of concurrent jurisdiction, does no justice to the true 
nature of the situation.57  The U.S. Supreme Court in Mitchell v. 
United States offered the rationalization that, by virtue of the 
trust agreement, tribal governments relegate some relative con-
trol to Congress in exchange for its protections and support.58  
The fiduciary arrangement of the federal trust agreement does 
not implicate a legally cognizable justification for limiting the 
ability of either a tribal government or a court to regulate inter-
nal affairs.59   
Although the initial framing of the relationship between the 
government and tribes is like a guardian to its ward, the more 
fitting paradigm is created under the laws of trust.60  Under the 
guardian and ward paradigm, there is an assumption that the 
ward is incapable of managing its own affairs, or actually has no 
say in those affairs.61  In contrast, the purpose of the trust agree-
ment is to empower tribes and to fortify the development of po-
litical and legal systems capable of assuming the role of manag-
ing tribal affairs.62  Again, common-law trust doctrine prohibits 
trustees from taking actions that result in a personal advantage 
or gain if that action harms its beneficiary.63  In implementing 
the concurrent jurisdiction scheme, Congress perpetuated its 
dominion over Indian country to the detriment of tribal self-
government.  
CONCURRENT JURISDICTION DENIES AMERICAN INDIAN 
WOMEN EQUAL PROTECTION OF THE LAW 
American Indian women have neither equivalent levels of 
protection nor equitable avenues of legal reprisal in Indian 
Country because the U.S. federal government makes the arbi-
trary jurisdictional distinction between tribal members and non-
tribal members.64  The laws as they exist in Indian Country, as 
well as the scope of enforcement of these laws, differ arbitrarily 
in contrast to the laws that govern non-tribal members.65  It 
would be difficult for the federal government to devise a basis 
for permitting a lack of equity in legal protection such as what 
currently exists in Indian Country.66  Because the federal gov-
ernment marks jurisdictional boundaries along the status of 
tribal membership, sexual violence against American Indian 
women persists at higher rates than for women in other parts of 
the country.67   
Statistics estimate that 70% of the American Indian victims 
of rape or sexual assault reported to an offender of a different 
race indicates an inherent flaw in Congress’ denial of tribal au-
thority to prosecute non-Indian assailants.68  The number of 
American Indian women who suffer from sexual assaults is dra-
matic to the extent that there is likely a deeper systemic catalyst 
than just the social and economic differences that these women 
face.  Socio-economic distinctions between American Indian 
women and women of other races provide no discernable, com-
plete explanation for the staggering disparity in incidents of sex-
ual assault among Indian women compared to incidents involv-
ing victims of other races.69   
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 The only evident justification for this arbitrary racial classi-
fication is the United States’ interest in protecting non-Indians, 
because there is no substantiation of Indian protection reflected 
in these laws.70  Rather, in advancing this interest, it seems that 
the measures this statute takes severely undermine the protection 
of the true victims in these crimes, with no inclination of a com-
pelling governmental interest.71  This is particularly true with a 
crime like sexual assault because there is an indefinite extent of 
mental injury accompanying the physical pain and torment.72  It 
seems senseless to limit what crimes can be enforced, and then 
bind the scope of enforcement almost arbitrarily to the point of 
rendering the punishment ineffective in deterring the crime.73     
THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT SHOULD ABANDON ITS 
CONCURRENT JURISDICTION POLICY AND EMPOWER 
TRIBES TO REGULATE ALL AFFAIRS ON TRIBAL LANDS 
In Duro v. Reina, the Supreme Court expressly stated that 
the notion of non-Indian implied consent to tribal criminal juris-
diction is invalid, but there was no clear explanation for the 
Court’s decision.74  The Court simply dismissed the possibility 
of implied consent by stating “nonmembers who share relevant 
jurisdictional characteristics of non-Indians, should share the 
same jurisdictional status.”75  This vague statement seems to 
mean that non-members are only subjected to laws outside of the 
sphere of local tribal governments.  Unsurprisingly, the Court 
did not consider the potentially negative implications resulting 
from its logically defunct interpretations of tribal sovereignty.76 
The authority to oversee sexual assault claims when the vic-
tim is a member of the tribe is necessary to protect internal rela-
tions,77  especially when considering the clashing cultural dy-
namics of Indian Country.78  For example, American Indian 
women may be hesitant to report assaults because law enforce-
ment and sexual assault specialists generally are outsiders, much 
like the criminals that assault them.79  About 70 % of the re-
ported crimes in Indian Country are reported to non-Indians.80   
The other likely cause of underreporting is that even when 
acknowledged, there is no heavy pursuit of sexual assault assail-
ants, mainly because the criminals are non-Indian and thus able 
to escape through the perforated holes in the confusing concur-
rent jurisdiction scheme.81  As a result of this aspect of the judi-
cial system, the general sentiment among American Indian 
women is that not only will response to reports take an unduly 
long time, but that no semblance of justice will result because 
American Indians see non-Indians as a privileged class on tribal 
lands.82  In considering cultural implications, concurrent jurisdic-
tion reinforces the subjugated mentality ingrained in the con-
sciousness of American Indians for centuries, which makes it 
more difficult to create a bridge of trust between American Indi-
ans and non-tribal members,83 and ultimately weakens commu-
nity ties within tribes.84 
Sexual assault directly affects internal relations in small 
American Indian communities where the strength and continuity 
of the community is dependent upon the individual’s sense of 
connectedness.85  American Indian tribes subscribe to communal 
values as the guiding principles for the laws that govern an indi-
vidual’s conduct.86  This preference does not mean that the group 
ignores individual interests.  Rather, American Indian laws strive 
to protect individuals, while at the same time, preserving the 
cultural beliefs and practices of the collective framework.87  
Thus, tribes build their society based on community and rela-
tional functions.88  In the context of this social structure, it is 
impractical to have an outside force dictating which rights and 
values should exist in Indian Country.89  The impracticality of 
such a relationship is especially apparent when the imposing 
force is foreign to the established relationships within the com-
munity and the shared common historical experience that contex-
tualizes the existing values and norms of that society.90   
In the abstract, American jurisprudence is a reflection of 
socially intrinsic values, based upon our historically bound ex-
periences and common motivations.91  The commonality of val-
ues and perceptions among most American Indian tribes stands 
in stark contrast from those values and views historically im-
posed by the majority culture in the United States.92  Therefore, 
preservation of the sanctity of the American Indian community is 
only possible when the laws reflect the communal values of In-
dian Country and not the values of a foreign society or main-
stream America.93  Ultimately, court interpretations of tribal sov-
ereignty frequently limit the reach of tribal authority, opting in-
stead to grant deference to the plenary powers of Congress, 
which facially remain insensitive to the true needs of tribal com-
munities.   
CONCLUSION 
The disproportionate rate of sexual assault in Indian Country 
is a product of the federal government abandoning its trust re-
sponsibilities and implementing its arbitrary and confusing con-
current jurisdiction policies.  Pursuant to its trust responsibility, 
the federal government and its agencies must not adopt or prom-
ulgate practices or regulations that compromise their fiduciary 
duties.94  The trustee must always act in the interests of the bene-
ficiaries.95  Indian Country needs a firmer adherence by the fed-
eral government to the true nature of its trust responsibility.  This 
would entail an abandonment of the current jurisdiction scheme 
in which tribal courts are powerless to effectuate the laws of 
their own land and equal protection eludes victims of sexual as-
sault.   
With the power to perpetuate and enforce the laws, tribal 
dependence on the federal government will diminish.  Although 
it is apparent that this is exactly what the federal government 
does not want, with the demise of concurrent jurisdiction, un-
doubtedly a decline in the existing problems in Indian Country, 
such as the rampant episodes of sexual assault, will ensue.  Al-
though this phenomenon probably comes as no surprise to the 
victims,96 it is difficult to find adequate justification for its per-
petuation.  
The federal government’s jurisdiction prior to Public Law 
280 and the states’ jurisdiction following its passage are too 
broad and conflict with the concept of tribal self-government as 
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 well as the historically acknowledged characterization of Indian 
Country as a sovereign nation.97  If Indian sovereignty predates 
that of the United States, then it inherently follows that many 
actions of the United States, however justifiable within the rela-
tive historical, social, or legal context, serve as limitations on 
Indian sovereignty.98  Consequently, any claims of preserving 
the inherent powers of Indian self-government99 are fundamen-
tally flawed in that the federal government only protects those 
powers of self-government it creates and grants.100  True sover-
eignty, and thus true self-government, cannot exist where an-
other entity dictates and maintains the authority to interpret and 
redefine its scope.101  Ultimately, tribal courts and tribal law 
enforcement are essential institutions of tribal self-
government.102  Tribal self-government falters when these insti-
tutions are not exclusively within the dominion of the tribe.103 
The existence of concurrent jurisdiction through Public Law 
280 also violates the federal trust agreement by exacerbating 
tribal rights to self-government.104  Concurrent jurisdiction only 
preserves the interests of the federal government.105  Unfortu-
nately, as a result of repeated subjugation, a constant denial of 
the assertion of its rights, and the federal government’s inability 
and reluctance to legitimize tribal self-government,106 Indian 
Country is deficient in its ability to hold the federal government 
accountable.107  
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 A DIRECT APPROACH TO REPARATIONS:  
MUNICIPAL EFFORTS TO ENSURE SOCIAL JUSTICE 
 
By Samuel Emiliano Brown* 
O n April 12, 2005, Oakland City Council Member Larry Reid introduced a measure (the Oakland Ordinance)1 that would require all corporations doing business with 
the City of Oakland to divulge information regarding past con-
nections to African American slavery in the United States.  The 
Chicago City Council approved a similar measure2 in October 
2002, followed by the Los Angeles City Council in June 2003.  
In the same manner, city governments across the nation passed 
resolutions calling for the federal government to apologize for 
the institution of slavery or to provide specific remedies to com-
bat the lasting effects felt by the legacy of slavery.3  The primary 
purpose of these municipal actions is to facilitate the accumula-
tion of information that could buttress future claims for redress 
from descendants of African slaves in the United States.  An 
important auxiliary purpose is to obtain financial contributions 
for college scholarships and economic development programs for 
the communities in which the descendants of slaves comprise the 
majority of the residents. 
Other municipal efforts include debates in the city councils 
of Chicago and Detroit over proposed bills that would give Afri-
can Americans a large tax credit.  The rationale for this credit is 
that it will serve as a partial compensation for the forty acres and 
a mule, promised to newly freed slaves immediately after the 
Civil War.4 
This article first examines the history of reparations in the 
United States, specifically looking at the legal system and legis-
lative attempts at the state and local levels.  Second, it will ad-
dress legal and practical concerns about reparations generally.  
The article will then analyze the recent Oakland ordinance spe-
cifically.  Finally, it will look towards the future and analyze the 
direction of the modern slave reparations movement and what 
reparations could mean for African Americans and the entire 
nation.  This article also incorporates insight on the issue of repa-
rations from Council Member Desley Brooks of the Oakland 
City Council.5 
HISTORY OF REPARATIONS 
Reparations are not a new concept.  Indeed, many groups 
have received reparations for past wrongs.  For example, Holo-
caust survivors, American Indians, Alaskan Natives, and Japa-
nese Americans have received compensation for gross atrocities.  
Admittedly, African American slavery in the United States ended 
eighty years before the Holocaust ended and both existed under 
somewhat different circumstances.  Many American Indians and 
Alaskan Natives can point to prior treaties and legally binding 
agreements which arguably makes their current claims more for 
fulfilling contract obligations than reparations for past wrongs.  
However, the basic concept of reparations, “to make whole,” is 
the same for all.  Georgetown professor Richard America noted, 
“Slavery produced benefits and enriched whites as a class at the 
expense of [b]lacks as a class…reparations is not about making 
up the past, but dealing with current problems.”6  
The call for African American reparations is most like the 
case for Japanese Americans.  During World War II, the United 
States detained Japanese Americans in internment camps 
throughout the western states to allay fears of their involvement 
in espionage or other activities detrimental to national security.  
Many lost their property, jobs, and sense of security as their lives 
disintegrated before their eyes.  In order to recompense this 
group for the harm caused by the federal government, Congress 
passed the Civil Liberties Act of 1988.7  To avoid, or curtail, 
questions of government discrimination in fashioning a remedy 
that would serve to aid Japanese Americans as a specific racial 
group, the authors of the bill identified class members as 
“surviving detainees” and their children.8  The text of the bill 
also indicates that money from the fund would go towards spon-
soring research and public education activities, especially to illu-
minate and understand the events surrounding the evacuation 
goals.9  
THE CASE FOR REPARATIONS 
African American slavery in the United States helped facili-
tate the beginning of the greatest accumulation of wealth in our 
nation’s history.10  Many examples exist of the tremendous 
amount of wealth attained from African American slavery-
related profits, which built some of modern America’s largest 
fortunes.  Many institutions such as Exxon (formerly Standard 
Oil), the Hartford Courant, J.P. Morgan, Fleet Bank (formerly 
Providence Bank), and Brown University obtained their initial 
capital from money acquired either directly or indirectly from 
African American slavery in the United States.11  In 1781, Robert 
Morris founded Wachovia Bank, the nation’s fourth-largest, 
from slave trade profits.12  As a result of information obtained 
through the Chicago ordinance, J. P. Morgan acknowledged that 
banks it had once owned had taken possession of over 1,200 
slaves who were being held as collateral.13  In response, the bank 
apologized and established a scholarship fund for African 
Americans.   
Why would J.P. Morgan donate $5 million for a crime com-
mitted over a century ago?  The answer may lie in a contract 
theory known as unjust enrichment: 
1. The retention of a benefit conferred by another, without 
offering compensation, in circumstances where com-
pensation is reasonably expected.   
2. A benefit obtained from another, not intended as a gift 
and not legally justifiable, for which the beneficiary 
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must make restitution or recompense.14  
Few could successfully argue that 400 years of forced labor 
and discrimination in the United States, resulting in massive 
amounts of wealth for some groups, and poverty and oppression 
for another, did not constitute unjust enrichment.  American 
business owners and shareholders “retained the benefit” of enor-
mous profits, and capital, with which to invest and foster more 
wealth.  This wealth was “conferred by another,” African slaves, 
in the form of labor under “circumstances where compensation 
is reasonably expected.”  In such situations, the law says “the 
beneficiary must make restitution or recompense.” 
Examples such as these hold little sway due to the myriad of 
obstacles that hinder any attempt to gain reparations through the 
courts.  Some of the largest of these include overcoming the 
statute of limitations,15 identifying the class, concerns about 
offsets, and the overwhelming dearth of information on actual 
statistics and figures for African American slavery in the United 
States.16  Those with standing to make a claim for restitution, 
slaves themselves, were essentially shut out of the United States 
legal system for a century following their so-called 
“emancipation.”  African Americans did not obtain full rights as 
United States citizens until the 1960s.  The first generation of 
people to grow up with full citizen rights made claims against 
the government for its part in African American slavery, and the 
lasting effects thereof.    
In 1995, Jewel Cato attempted to sue the federal govern-
ment for an apology and damages arising from the enslavement 
of and subsequent discrimination against African Americans.17 
The Ninth Circuit dismissed the case, citing sovereign immu-
nity, jurisdictional hurdles, generalized class-based claims, and 
lack of standing.18  After the Ninth Circuit, the most liberal in 
the nation, dismissed Cato, many reparations organizations and 
activists had to rethink their strategies.  This led to efforts to 
involve legislatures at the state and local levels.  
REPARATIONS LEGISLATION 
Council Member Brooks discussed her feelings on the dif-
ference in attitudes towards the Maafa19 and the Holocaust.  She 
explained that when people speak of Africa or African Ameri-
cans, there seems to be devaluation for black lives and accom-
plishments versus white ones, citing recent genocides in Rwanda 
and Sudan as examples.   
Americans have a history of exhibiting a general reluctance 
in acknowledging and honoring contributions of Africans and 
African Americans.  In 1968, Michigan Congressman John Con-
yers introduced a bill to create a federal holiday to honor        
Dr.  Martin Luther King, Jr.20  Many in Congress considered his 
idea “radical” and it took 15 years for Congress to acquiesce to 
its passage.  In January 1989, Conyers introduced H.R. 40, 
“Commission to Study Reparation Proposals for African Ameri-
cans Act”, which many have also deemed a radical measure.  
Despite the criticism, Conyers has introduced the bill every year 
since, and plans to do so until Congress passes it into law.  He 
chose the number forty as a symbol of the original promise of 
forty acres and a mule to freed slaves.  H.R. 40 seeks to accom-
plish four major goals: 
1) Acknowledge the fundamental injustice and in-
humanity of African American slavery; 2) Estab-
lish a commission to study slavery, its subsequent 
racial and economic discrimination against freed 
slaves; 3) Discover the impact of those forces on 
today's living African Americans; 4) Create a com-
mission which would then make recommendations 
to Congress on appropriate remedies to redress the 
harm inflicted on living African Americans.21  
In 2004, the Democratic Party endorsed H.R. 40 in its plat-
form, recognizing the importance of acknowledging and ad-
dressing the issue of reparations for African American slavery.22  
Despite these attempts, the federal government has been slow to 
answer the call for a full accounting of the history and impact of 
African American slavery in the United States.  This situation 
has lead to renewed efforts by state and local legislatures to 
study and respond to the impacts felt from the lasting legacy of 
African American slavery. 
STATE EFFORTS 
In 2000, California signed into law SB 2199, the Slave-
holder Insurance Policies Bill.23  This made California the first 
state to require companies believed to have profited from insur-
ing slaves to gather and report relevant history.24  SB 2199 is 
now part of the California Insurance Code and outlines a request 
for information on records of slaveholder insurance policies and 
a full-disclosure requirement to the descendants of slaves.25  To 
date, California has collected a list of slaveholders who held 
insurance policies on over 600 slaves.26  Iowa and Illinois have 
passed similar bills, resulting in a partial accounting of slave-
holder policies from companies and/or their predecessors, such 
as Aetna, AIG, and New York Life Insurance.27     
A similar bill has been proposed in North Carolina as well, 
state House Bill 1006, short-titled “State Contracts/Slavery Prof-
its.”  According to House Bill 1006, North Carolina would be 
able to terminate a contract entered into with a vendor if the 
vendor fails to fully and accurately complete a required affidavit 
regarding any past connection to African American slavery.28  
Critics of these state efforts say lawmakers have too much time 
on their hands.  Many of the arguments against such legislation 
are not without merit.  
 Is it fair to hold modern corporations accountable for busi-
ness transactions from the 18th and 19th centuries?  First, records 
from that era are difficult to come by, making research into this 
area close to impossible.  Second, many of these modern-day 
companies have only a weak connection to the parent companies 
that may have profited from the slave trade.  Finally, some argue 
that slave reparations are simply unconstitutional. 
OPPOSING ARGUMENTS AND CONCERNS 
Many Americans of all colors question the validity of repa-
rations and have valid legal and practical concerns.  The first 
 question many people ask is whether reparations rise to the level 
of a compelling state interest.  In determining whether a state or 
federal government can consider race through legislative efforts, 
courts require that it be for a compelling state interest.29 
Another concern is the fact that African American slavery 
was legal in the United States.  How can African Americans 
make a claim for African American slavery-based reparations 
when those who committed the “crime” were not committing a 
crime at the time?  The Constitution prohibits ex post facto laws 
that identify certain conduct as criminal even though it was legal 
at the time.  Finally, how can the government fashion a remedy 
to redress policies and customs of racism without some form of 
discrimination? 
 Proponents of reparations note that they do not seek repara-
tions solely from “white” people; they seek redress from an en-
tire society whose wealth was built on free slave labor.  Council 
Member Brooks commented, “as a local official I take pride in 
the fact that we can effect change and that we can focus on these 
issues.  What would cities be like if all we did was collect taxes 
and write budgets?”30  Alluding to the previous comments about 
the change in attitude when slave reparations is at issue, it is 
curious that critics are not so fervently against reparations to 
Native Americans for their stolen land, a series of injustices 
which also occurred over 150 years ago.  African American 
slavery, like the settling of the western United States, was a 
state-sanctioned operation, given weight and authority through 
the most sacred of all American documents, the United States 
Constitution itself.  Fortunately, for some, the Constitution has 
not been a bar to attaining restitution from the federal govern-
ment for discriminatory policies and practices. 
In assessing how to fashion a non-discriminatory remedy, 
many proponents point to the Civil Liberties Act of 1988.  As 
noted above, this act does not define its beneficiaries racially, 
but instead defines them as “surviving detainees” and “their 
children.”  Legislators in the case for African American repara-
tions also redefined the class of people.  Rather than directing 
benefits of reparations to “African Americans” or “blacks,” the 
prospective class members are identified as “descendants of 
slaves.”  This is an important distinction that, like the Civil Lib-
erties Act, identifies group membership based on a shared ex-
perience rather than a racial characteristic.  In this way, informa-
tion gathered to more accurately reflect the history of African 
American slavery will impress upon future generations that 
slave reparations were meant to redress 400 years of free labor 
and discrimination, not simply given to one group because of 
their race.  More importantly, it eliminates an important consti-
tutional obstacle; the equal protection doctrine prohibits state-
sanctioned discrimination based on race.  By changing the char-
acterization of the victims, programs aimed at redressing injus-
tice to slave-descendants cannot be shot down as violating equal 
protection because they are based on their relation to African 
American slavery, not their racial background. 
As for the issue of compelling interests, Council Member 
Brooks, although opposed to the Oakland ordinance, agrees that 
in the case of reparations, state and local governments might 
have a compelling interest upon which to base such legislation.  
She contends, “from a policy standpoint, the legacy of slavery 
continues to cost extra tax money to everyone.  Remedying the 
lasting problems specific to African American communities 
would be economically beneficial and efficient for every citizen, 
not just African Americans.”31  Legislation that is economically 
beneficial for all citizens and narrowly tailored to remedy prob-
lems specific to African American communities as a result of 
past discrimination has a fair chance of passing the strict scru-
tiny standard set by the Supreme Court.32   
With regards to the concern about compensation for a prior 
legal act, many proponents would note that reparations legisla-
tion does not seek to ‘‘punish’’ taxpayers by holding them ac-
countable for the actions of long-dead slaveholders.  What these 
laws seek to accomplish is to hold accountable corporations that 
transferred wealth from the free labor of slaves into their coffers, 
and for an official recognition that many Americans were, and 
still are, unjustly enriched from the legacy of African American 
slavery and discrimination.   
In Alaska, indigenous tribes receive a percentage of the 
revenue from oil sales because the government acknowledged 
that oil companies are, and have been, profiting from the loss of 
lands suffered by these groups.33  Alaskan taxpayers do not op-
pose these laws because they recognize that much of the wealth 
created by the oil industry filters down through Alaskan econo-
mies and benefits everyone.  In the same vein, the wealth made 
from African American slavery has been a major component in 
building wealth in the United States.  From tobacco to cotton to 
sugar production, free slave labor played a major part in build-
ing the wealth that would facilitate the post-Civil War industrial 
revolution.   
Americans have benefited from the labor of slaves and from 
the legacy of discriminatory practices in other ways as well.  
After the Civil War, four million African Americans were set 
free with disillusions of receiving a promised forty acres and a 
mule.  Rather than allowing them to work on the East Coast, the 
United States allowed hundreds of thousands of eastern and 
southern Europeans to immigrate to the United States to serve as 
laborers in the factories of the north.34  Many argue that since 
their great-grandparents or grandparents arrived here after Afri-
can American slavery and the Civil War, they have never bene-
fited from African American slavery or discrimination.  To the 
contrary, many Europeans who immigrated to the United States 
were able to find work because it was the general custom in the 
United States to deny those jobs to African Americans based on 
the legacy of African American slavery and discrimination.35  
While Americans often subscribe to the dominant settler ideol-
ogy that we are a nation of immigrants, it is often overlooked 
that the majority of African Americans did not voluntarily immi-
grate, but were brought here against their will. 
As descendants of immigrants bought homes and land, de-
scendants of slaves were restricted from a fundamental Constitu-
tional right, the right to own property.  This continued in various 
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 forms through the 1950’s, when the federal government pro-
moted a policy known as “red-lining” which denied affordable 
housing to African Americans.  Whether a non-African Ameri-
can citizen supported this policy or not, many inevitably bene-
fited by the increase in available housing due to discriminatory 
practices such as this.   
THE OAKLAND ORDINANCE 
Reparations can come in many forms, including cash pay-
ments, land, economic development, and repatriation resources 
for slave descendants.  Other forms of reparations for slave de-
scendants may come through the creation of honest depictions of 
African American history: funds for scholarships and commu-
nity development, building of historical museums and monu-
ments, the return of stolen artifacts and art to their respective 
peoples and institutions, exoneration of political prisoners, and 
the elimination of laws and practices that maintain dual systems 
in the criminal justice, health, education, and the financial and 
economic systems.   
Council Member Brooks did take issue with some of the 
ways reparations legislation, particularly Oakland’s, would re-
dress past grievances.  She believes that the ordinance does not 
go far enough in specifically redressing past discrimination and 
explains why she abstained from the vote of the recent Oakland 
ordinance: 
In Oakland, the 580 freeway is like a Mason-
Dixie line where one side is whites and the other 
side is African Americans and Hispanics.  There is a 
large separation in Oakland between the haves and 
have-nots based in large part on race, how does it 
happen that it plays out like that?  Is it coincidence?  
No, it represents a vestige of policies that were put 
in place a long time ago.  The ordinance could be 
useful, so I didn’t cast a “no” vote.  But I couldn’t, 
in good conscience, forget my past and allow (the 
ordinance) to be watered down by those who don’t 
come from the same place.  The fund does not ad-
dress individual compensation, but is set up to bene-
fit ‘historically Black areas’, like East and West 
Oakland.  The Oakland ordinance is a farce because 
it will not go directly to those it is aimed at, specifi-
cally, African Americans in Oakland who have his-
torically suffered economically at the hands of ra-
cism.  The 2 areas targeted: East/West Oakland are 
traditionally African American neighborhoods, but 
due to the effects of gentrification, they are quickly 
losing their African American dominance.  This 
means money meant to compensate descendants of 
slaves will go to historical black neighborhoods that 
are currently only about 50% black.  In four to five 
years these neighborhoods might have very little 
black population but because of the way the ordi-
nance is written, money will still go to these areas.  
The ordinance should direct funds recovered to 
black community groups and black schools, not nec-
essarily historically black neighborhoods that won’t 
even be black in the near future.  The same goes for 
schools, if money goes to schools in historically 
black neighborhoods but all the black people are 
moved out and Asians and whites move in then the 
same thing that happened with segregation in the 
1950’s will happen here: the majority that doesn’t 
need assistance will benefit more from the ordinance 
than those the ordinance sought to assist. 
Using historically black neighborhoods was a 
bad measuring criterion because it doesn’t address 
the impacts of the legacy of slavery.  Anyone in a 
particular area would benefit, not necessarily Afri-
can Americans.  West Oakland is the lowest income 
area in the city, the average income is less than 
$26,000 but it is the neighborhood closest to the last 
BART station in Oakland (prime real estate).  It is 
now being gentrified and if money pours into those 
schools in the next 4-5 years from the ordinance’s 
fund, most of it will benefit the yuppie families who 
move in, not the poor African American families 
who live there now and who need better schools. 
I want to do things that have real impact.  I 
don’t think anything substantive has been done here 
and I couldn’t support that.  On the issue of repara-
tions, it is important that African Americans seek 
out justice but we must also ‘watch what you ask 
for’ and be sure that the remedy being fashioned will 
actually be to your benefit before you throw your 
support behind it.36 
In light of Council Member Brooks’ response, it is clear 
that creating sustainable legislation that properly addresses 
this issue will be problematic.   
CONCLUSION 
The reparations issue forces us to ask many tough ques-
tions.  Should the government compensate the great-great grand-
children of slaves, whose foremothers and forefathers worked 
for free and were deprived of an education?  If the slaves and 
their direct descendants were denied the right to sue for compen-
sation, do we allow the statute of limitations to control the issue 
and say “tough luck” to slave descendants who now have the 
rights their forefathers did not have?  Is it fair to require taxpay-
ers who never owned slaves to pay for the sins of long-dead 
Americans?  How should the government determine who is a 
descendant?   
This initial round of reparations legislation is not aimed at 
producing clear-cut answers to these questions.  Some lawmak-
ers are simply asking that their government devote some re-
sources into researching the issue.  Isn’t it about time the gov-
ernment starts accepting the equally truthful reality that the 
United States might not exist as we know it without the free 
labor and sacrifice of Africans and African Americans? 
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